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The misery that so many are in is a most affecting thing, but where 
we do all we can we must trust to providence to do the rest 
     -- James Francis Edward Stuart 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter One: An Introduction to the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 
 
The early eighteenth century was rife with social change, conflict, and political 
turmoil. One movement in particular, the Jacobite movement, which sought to restore the 
exiled Stuarts to the thrones of England and Scotland, had a profound effect on European 
political affairs. The Jacobites or the followers of James (the Stuart heir to the thrones of 
England, Scotland, and Ireland) persistently sought to reclaim the throne of the three 
kingdoms after their loss to William of Orange in 1688. The Jacobites’ attempts to invade 
England, Scotland, and Ireland, known as the Jacobite Rebellions, in1708, 1715, 1719, and 
1745, plus several other attempts that never moved past the planning stage, all failed. Yet, 
scholars and historians have studied them as a series of important potential turning points in 
British, European, and even World history.  
Since 1688, many works have been published describing the history and origins of the 
Jacobite movement. In the early and middle parts of the eighteenth century, the Jacobites and 
the Jacobite movement was viewed in one of two ways. The movement was seen either as a 
righteous quest to restore the “true” king of Britain to his throne, or as a treasonous cabal led 
by a group of ruffians who were bent on destroying the kingdom. It was not until the late 
eighteenth century, when the Jacobite movement was no longer a threat to the British 
government, that it became romanticized in common lore as the harmless bravado of young 
Scottish nobles (especially since one could then talk about it without the risk of punishment). 
The first major Jacobite “historian” Sir Walter Scott added to this romantic vision of the 
Jacobites. His 1817 work Rob Roy, which was set against the backdrop of the 1715 Jacobite 
Rebellion, helped turn a ruthless cattle thief (as many of his enemies called him) into a global 
2 
 
hero.
1
 For much of the rest of the eighteenth and through the early part of the twentieth 
century, the Jacobites kept this luster, and were viewed as noble men who pursued their own 
cause, but never posed a serious threat to the well-established British government.  
By the middle of the twentieth century, scholarly interest in the Jacobite movement 
revived. Many new histories shed a favorable light on the Jacobites and the Stuart cause. 
Charles Petrie was just one of the many authors writing with this perspective. His 1948 work 
The Jacobite Movement the First Phase: 1688-1715, brought about a new take on one of the 
Jacobites most important figures, James II. It was widely accepted to that time that James II 
was a tyrant, who was obsessed with power and a terrible ruler who was completely unaware 
of how to run a government. He was so awful that William and Mary overthrew him in the 
Glorious Revolution. Petrie’s work began to challenge this perspective and argued, although 
almost to the point of supporting the Jacobites, that perhaps James was not nearly the tyrant 
everyone thought, but his work did little to change the established views. Petrie went on to 
write about the rest of the Jacobite movement and blamed the failures of the fifteen and the 
forty-five on poor leadership. By the 1970’s and 80’s interest in the Jacobite movement 
revived yet again thanks in large part to the anniversary of the Glorious Revolution that was 
fast approaching in 1988. Scholarship was divided between two assessments of James II and 
the Jacobite movement. The first held that the whole lot were utterly wretched, taking up the 
traditional view that James II was an evil ignorant tyrant and coupled it with Petrie’s thesis 
that the rest of the Jacobite movement was doomed to fail because it was never an organized 
force. The second viewpoint from historians such as Jonathan Clark was that James was not 
as bad as people thought, but was not very effective at running a country, and the Jacobite 
movement failed as a whole because of unlucky circumstances. Clark and other scholars 
writing in the 1980’s began to interpret the Jacobite movement different from the established 
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 Walter Scott, Rob Roy (London: Dent, 1966), introduction from 1828 edition. 
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view because of the new developments in social and economic history. As scholars focused 
more on the individual and less on established political hegemonies, Clark and others noticed 
that the Jacobite ideology was not just about overthrowing the government, but it had a 
different view of how to run a government. By the late twentieth century these were the two 
dominant arguments of Jacobite history and the three major areas of study in the history of 
the Jacobites were James II and the 1688 Glorious Revolution, the 1715 Jacobite rebellion, 
and the 1745 Jacobite rebellion.  
Two of the more successful and largest of the rebellions, the fifteen and the forty-five 
have been most extensively studied. Much of this attention is because of the Jacobites’ 
(partial) success in mobilizing segments of the British population behind the Jacobite cause 
during these campaigns and the availability of the sources. The fifteen was the best funded of 
all the Jacobite Rebellions, and the forty-five was the most successful, with the Jacobites 
making it to within one hundred miles of London before turning back thanks to poor 
intelligence about the political and military situation as well as good espionage work by 
loyalists to king George I. The work on the fifteen and the forty-five is extensive. For 
instance, there are seven books alone written on the 1746 battle of Culloden.
2
 The abundant 
sources for these two rebellions have been accessible to scholars for decades. The publication 
of the Stuart Papers of Windsor Palace, the best source for the events of these rebellions, is in 
part responsible for the abundance of work done. In addition to Charles Petrie, Elizabeth 
Cruickshanks and even Winston Churchill have written on the Jacobite movement.  
Other historians such as Jonathan Oates have branched out and filled in the gaps left 
behind by previous scholars, covering the entire movement from the 1660’s until 1807 (the 
date when the last Stuart heir to the throne died).  Oates focused on aspects such as troop 
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 Jonathan Oates, The Jacobite Campaigns: The British State at War (London: Pickering &         
Chatto, 2011), 1. 
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organization and supplies in his 2011 work The Jacobite Campaigns. Recent revisionist work 
from Steve Pincus in 1688 (2009) and Scott Sowerby’s Making Toleration (2013) is again 
changing the way historians view James II and even the early Jacobite movement. Pincus and 
Sowerby argue that James II was in fact a very smart man, and knew exactly what he was 
doing running the country. According to their arguments, James II had a vision of how he 
wanted England, Scotland, and Ireland to operate. The only problem was that the population 
of his subjects did not share his vision and he failed to win their support. Pincus and Sowerby 
both brought new archival evidence to their arguments. Pincus expanded the source material 
using more Dutch archives than previous historians had and reexamined the “Glorious” 
Revolution to classify it as the first modern revolution. Sowerby agrees with Pincus that it 
was a modern revolution, but disagrees that it was what the majority wanted citing newly 
found journals and voting records.  Their new works are, in addition to the quality work and 
in-depth analysis on the fifteen and the forty-five, making further improvements to our 
understandings of these three areas (1688, 1715, 1745) of the Jacobite movement, but the 
same is not true of the other Jacobite Rebellions, especially the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719. 
It is unsurprising that there have been few studies of the 1719 rebellion, given the lack 
of sources and a rebellion that was not nearly as successful as the forty-five, or as well funded 
as the fifteen. In studies of the fifteen and the forty-five, scholars mention the 1719 rebellion, 
but in little detail. The most significant works of the 1719 rebellion are William Dickson’s 
1895 book The Jacobite Attempt of 1719 and Lawrence Smith’s Spain and Britain 1715-
1719: The Jacobite Issue from 1987. The work done by these scholars of the Jacobite 
Rebellion of 1719 establish initial, but incomplete, narratives of the rebellion. They have 
reconstructed its broad contours: In late 1718, King Philip of Spain and his Prime Minister 
Giulio Alberoni joined with James Francis Edward Stuart and the Duke of Ormonde of the 
Jacobites to fight a common enemy. Together in early 1719, they launched a remarkably 
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ambitious naval invasion of Britain whose purpose was to raise a rebellion of Scots and 
disaffected Englishmen in order to overthrow Hanoverian monarch, George I. They contend 
that the rebellion was ultimately unsuccessful mainly because a significant weather event 
destroyed the Spanish Armada destined for Britain. Which are different from the reasons for 
the failures of the fifteen and the forty-five that failed because of poor leadership and a lack of 
supplies. 
 To date, Dickson’s study had been the book on the 1719 rebellion. Scholars studying 
the rest of the Jacobite movement usually cited Dickson when they mention the 1719 
rebellion. Dickson devoted fifty pages of narrative to the 1719 rebellion and edited and 
translated (from French) parts of over two hundred pages of letters mainly from the Duke of 
Ormonde taken out of the Stuart Papers. Dickson’s narrative does well to map out the 1719 
Jacobite Rebellion. Half of his work covers the early planning of the rebellion from October 
1718 until the expedition launches in March 1719. He then briefly covers the storm that 
damaged the Spanish fleet, mentioning it in just two paragraphs. The rest of his narrative 
describes the rebellion in Scotland. Although his narrative covers all of the major events of 
the 1719 rebellion, Dickson fails to explore the severity of the storm that damaged the 
Spanish fleet or assess how great a factor it was in the failure of the rebellion.  
Smith took a slightly different approach and examined the economic connections 
between Spain and the Jacobites. Using sources from Spanish archives in Seville (the center 
of Spanish trade until 1717) Cadiz, and Madrid he argued that Spain had been discreetly 
financing the Jacobites since 1715.
3
 Thus, Smith improved upon Dickson by showing that 
Spain and the Jacobites had established a relationship well before they began planning an 
invasion 1718. Smith also did well in examining what the major players in the rebellion 
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 Lawrence Bartlam Smith, Spain and Britain, 1715-1719: The Jacobite Issue (New York:   
Garland Pub, 1987). 
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(Spain, Britain, Sweden, the Jacobites, Austria, and France) were doing between 1715 and 
1719 and how they interacted with each other and the relationship that each country had with 
the other. He argues that the war of the Quadruple Alliance did not begin in 1718 when Spain 
and Britain declared war, but earlier. The first date he provided was 1717 when Austria and 
Spain began to fight, but he also argues that earlier ties between Spain and its enemies during 
the War of the Quadruple Alliance were the tensions that started the war. Smith traced the 
origins of the war back to the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion when Spain and France supported the 
Jacobites and argued that this relationship changed with the death of Louis XIV and this 
turned France and Britain against Spain. Their two works (and Dickson’s work in particular) 
remain the best studies of the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion.  
This work will add to what Dickson and Smith have already covered. Although Smith 
did a better job at tracing the origins of the 1719 rebellion back to 1715, he did not go back 
far enough. To effectively understand the 1719 rebellion, one has to examine both the 1688 
“Glorious” Revolution and the War of Spanish Succession. This work will show the origins 
of the 1719 rebellion beginning in 1688 (and arguably even further back). Both works also 
devoted far too little attention -parts of two paragraphs- to the storm that damaged the 
Spanish fleet. Yet, it was the most important factor in determining the success or failure of 
the rebellion. By reconstructing the nature of the weather event and its effect on military 
operations as well as on Spain’s and the Jacobite’s evolving strategy this work will contribute 
to the previous work done on the 1719 rebellion and give a more complete assessment of who 
or what was to blame for its failure. 
I argue that the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 was not a singular event. It was an episode 
in the ongoing eighteenth century power struggle between Europe’s major powers. Because 
Spain lost the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the 1719 rebellion saw the separate 
causes of Spain, and the Jacobites align, and together they formed one major power during 
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the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720). The potential of this alliance was never 
realized. Because of the rebellion’s failure, Spain eventually agreed to give up its claims to 
the French, Sardinian, and Italian (Parma) thrones, Britain remained under the rule of the 
Hanoverian George I, and the Jacobites remained exiled from their native home. 
Nevertheless, if the 1719 rebellion had been successful, the balance of dominant powers in 
Europe would have changed in the eighteenth century for some time.  
To understand how an alliance between Spain and the Jacobites evolved it is 
necessary to trace its origins. In doing so we will accomplish another aim of this thesis, which 
is to add to the history of the War of the Quadruple Alliance (which has been largely 
ignored). Most historians of the early eighteenth-century European relations include a few 
pages on the War of the Quadruple Alliance and describe its outcome, but they ignore the 
war’s causes.4 Even less attention is devoted to the role of the Jacobite rebellion in this multi-
party European struggle.  
I wish to argue that the 1719 rebellion demonstrated the importance of the Jacobites in 
eighteenth century European politics.  I believe that they were not just a problem for Britain 
as in the fifteen or the forty-five, but as they showed when coordinating with Spain, they were 
an important factor in the international relations of Europe. Fortune was not with the 
Jacobites, however; the weather and several other unforeseen problems curtailed their plans. 
Despite what scholars know about the rebellion, several vital questions remain unanswered. 
Who dreamed up the plans for the rebellion? What did each side expect to gain from helping 
the other? If they were successful, would Spain have handed Britain over to the Jacobites? 
How much of a factor was the weather in the failure of the rebellion? Did the weather just 
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 It is hard to find many works that cover the War of the Quadruple Alliance. Most books that 
cover it like Wolfgang Michael’s England Under George I only do so through the perspective 
of another event in history. In this case George I and so this work focuses largely on the war 
as it affected England and ignores the other countries like France, Spain, and Austria and fails 
to trace the War’s origins between Spain and Austria.    
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serve as an excuse for the Spanish to cancel the expedition as political conditions changed 
and their interest flagged? In the end, was it truly a “Jacobite” rebellion? This thesis will 
investigate these questions—by, reconstructing the actual weather pattern of the storm, 
assessing its actual effects on the armada and its allies’ planning, provide the first full account 
of the major actors, deeds, and intentions, and assessing what each side hoped to gain from 
the rebellion.  
 After reconstructing the plan of attack, this thesis assesses the goals of each side in 
the 1719 rebellion. They both hoped for success and both failed to plan for major disaster. 
Yet, it seems, the lack of preparation was not entirely their fault. The weather, for example, 
was nearly impossible to predict in 1719. The accounts of the storm that damaged the Spanish 
fleet claim that it was an unusually powerful storm. We possess few sources to verify this, 
nor has anyone tried to do so. This thesis will also attempt to ascertain the size and strength 
of the storm form a variety of sources for March and April 1719: weather reports in 
newspapers from England, France, Spain, and Portugal, correspondence mentioning the 
weather during the time of the storm, barometric pressure readings taken during the storm, 
and logs from British ships sailing near the center and outer edges of the storm. All of this 
information and these sources are new to any history of the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. From 
them this thesis shows that the storm that damaged the Spanish Fleet in March of 1719 was a 
cut-off low pressure system that affected the entire western part of Europe. This type of cut-
off low was not a regular occurrence and would have been hard to predict at that time.  
After reconstructing the weather, this thesis assesses how well the planners prepared 
for the weather. The weather can answer many questions about the possibility of success. 
Spain was prepared to risk the weather and destruction by any fleet in the English Channel 
because it wanted to attack Britain at all costs as long as it was a small cost. The Jacobites 
were just as guilty of this haste to attack. The aftermath of the 1719 rebellion showed the 
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significance of the rebellion for both sides. After the rebellion, Spain gave up its claims in the 
Mediterranean, and the Jacobites made no serious attempt to restore the Stuart line to the 
British throne until 1745. From all of this we will ask and answer the question: was the 
invasion in 1719 truly a Jacobite Rebellion or just a Spanish ploy to hurt Britain? 
There is also one historiographical problem that I wish to address in this work. James 
Butler, the Duke of Ormonde, has a poor reputation from many historians because of his roles 
in the Jacobite movement (especially stemming from his role in the fifteen) and I believe that 
this is unwarranted. Charles Petrie blamed Ormonde for the failure of the fifteen in England, 
saying Ormonde’s flight left all the plans in shambles, but at the same time called the plans in 
western England (the area Ormonde was responsible for) well organized.
5
 Other historians 
have also been quick to discredit Ormonde as a Jacobite leader because of his role in the War 
of Spanish Succession (see chapter three). This work will show that Ormonde was not 
incompetent and in fact was largely responsible for leading and creating the 1719 rebellion.  
Limitations 
 There are some limitations to working on this project. First and most importantly, a 
portion of the sources that I would like to use are not available. Many of the ships logs that 
would have been helpful for chapter five are housed at the National Maritime Museum in 
Greenwich and at the National Archives in London and can only be consulted in person. I am 
still missing sources from Cardinal Alberoni. I am able to access most of Alberoni’s 
correspondence with the Jacobites through the archives of the Stuart Papers. Everything else 
that he wrote such as letters to Philip and British diplomats is preserved in correspondence in 
archives in Spain and in Britain. Because of these gaps in my source base, I am not able to 
assess fully Alberoni’s plans. There are several instances where what I have to go off of is not 
Alberoni’s letter to Philip and vice versa, but what Alberoni related to Ormonde about what 
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 Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), 174. 
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Philip or one of the other British diplomats wrote to him. In addition to this gap, there exists 
another. Weather data for certain years is not extant. For instance, records of temperature and 
barometric pressure are absent for many years from 1710-1720 in Britain. If those records 
ever do become available, they should confirm what will be presented in chapter five, but 
until those records are found, we will never know for certain. 
 The inspiration for this inquiry came from studying the Spanish Armada of 1588. It is 
rather remarkable how the two events mirror each other, except of course in proportion. 
There will not be a major comparison between the two events, but a small section will be 
dedicated to the (comparative) structural questions raised by the precedent of the Great 
Armada of 1588 and later invasions disrupted by major storms. This part includes a brief 
examination of the odd coincidence of bad luck or planning plaguing Spain both times it tried 
to invade England.  
 Following the introduction in this first chapter, chapter two provides a summary of the 
Jacobite Rebellions from 1688 until shortly after the 1715 rebellion. It stops when the goals 
of Spain and the Jacobites begin to align and the formation of an alliance begins. In addition, 
chapter two presents a summary of the Jacobite movement and an introduction into the Duke 
of Ormonde where I argue that he is not the unorganized and unskilled planner that previous 
historians have claimed. Chapter three provides the wider political context of the 1719 
Jacobite Rebellion, a summary of the War of Spanish Succession, and how unresolved 
problems from the war led to the War of the Quadruple Alliance and a Spanish and Jacobite 
Rebellion. I argue that it was these unresolved problems that cause the War of the Quadruple 
Alliance and chapter four will show how the two separate causes of the Jacobites and Spain 
aligned. It also reconstructs the stages of the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion, relating the roles of the 
many different people involved in the events. Chapter five reconstructs the cut-off low 
pressure system that devastated the Spanish flotilla. The reconstruction shows how the storm 
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prevented the Armada from making it to Britain. It will also relate how well Spain and the 
Jacobites prepared for the weather. Chapter six will draw on all these strands to answer the 
vexed question of the actors’ intentions and the reason for their failures. It will analyze how 
Spain and the Jacobites believed they could get rid of George I. A closer look at the plans of 
the rebellion, what each side lost in the rebellion, and the position each side had in the War of 
the Quadruple Alliance can help explain why Spain and the Jacobites were willing to attempt 
such an ambitious undertaking.  All of this, in turn, helps us determine that the 1719 Jacobite 
Rebellion truly was a “Jacobite” rebellion in both its goals and leadership, but only because 
of the precedent set by previous historians. As the Jacobites’ plans slowly started to fall apart, 
Spain took more control of the expedition. At this point it became apparent what Spain’s true 
goals were; control over the Mediterranean any way it could. 
 Chapter 2: The Jacobite Movement and Campaigns 
 
 The 1719 Jacobite Rebellion and the War of the Quadruple Alliance both originated 
near the beginning of the eighteenth century. The two events had their roots in decades-old 
disputes. The Jacobite period began after the 1688 “Glorious” Revolution; the War of the 
Quadruple Alliance was in many ways a continuation of the still unresolved disputes that had 
occasioned the War of Spanish Succession. With the benefit of hindsight, we see that both the 
Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 and the War of the Quadruple Alliance were parts of an even 
larger, multiparty European power struggle. Spain and the Jacobites were just two pawns 
used by the rest of Europe to help preserve the “balance of power” in the early eighteenth 
century. The early Jacobite movement helps explain why the 1719 rebellion occurred and the 
War of Spanish Succession helps explain Spain’s involvement in the War of the Quadruple 
Alliance. Chapter three discusses how the political events of the eighteenth century enticed 
Spain to join the Jacobite side of the rebellion. This chapter examines the Jacobite issue (as it 
is called) and how Stuart royal succession led to an unstable European political atmosphere.  
What is a Jacobite? 
 The two most challenging questions of any history of the Jacobites are: when does the 
Jacobite movement start and what is a Jacobite? There are several answers to each question in 
use and a multitude of books and essays are devoted to defining each question and answer. 
November 5, 1688 the day William of Orange arrived in England is a fitting date to begin the 
Jacobite movement, but starting here does not encompass all the necessary contextual 
material. Chronologically, one could start in fourteenth century Scotland with the first Stuart, 
Robert II, but for the purpose of this work it is more appropriate to begin later to help keep 
the muddled history of the Jacobites clear. It is, however, interesting to note that beginning 
with James I of Scotland, bad luck seems to have followed the Stuarts (luck being a terrible 
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word choice for a work of history, but there is really no better way to describe the Stuarts’s 
time as kings of Scotland and later on England). James I was murdered as was James III, 
James II died in an accident, James IV died in battle, James V died young, and Mary Queen 
of Scots and Charles I were executed.
6
 Despite their early and often untimely deaths, the 
Stuarts still managed to become the kings and queens of England, Ireland, and Scotland; 
ruling all three kingdoms for much of the seventeenth century. In 1603, James I and VI (he 
was James VI of Scotland, but James I of England) became the first Stuart and monarch of 
any line to rule over both Scotland and England. After James’s death his son Charles I 
became king. During his reign, Charles began to upset his English (and largely Protestant) 
subjects. First, he married a Catholic and his wife refused to be married in a Protestant 
church. Charles later began to seize more authority away from parliament with acts such as 
taxing without parliament’s consent. This tension erupted into a Civil War in the 1640’s. 
Eventually Charles and his followers lost on the battlefield and he was later beheaded, but his 
family fled Britain before they met the same fate once Parliament and Oliver Cromwell took 
over late in the 1640’s.7 Shortly after Cromwell’s death Charles I’s son, Charles II, received 
an invitation to return to Britain and became the British Monarch in 1660. Charles II’s 
brother James II and VII inherited the throne upon Charles II’s death in 1685, and it was 
during James II’s reign (or shortly thereafter) that the Jacobite movement began.8  
With a rough timeline of the Jacobites created, one important question remains; what 
is a Jacobite? Jacobus is Latin for James; so Jacobites were the supporters or followers of 
James (in this case James II). Despite the many varied and technical terms of what a Jacobite 
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 Ian Whyte and Kathleen A. Whyte, On the Trail of the Jacobites (London: Routledge, 
1990), 1; Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, The First Phase 1688-1716 (London: Eyre 
& Spottiswoode, 1948), appendix. 
7
 Richard Cust, Charles I: A Political Life (Harlow, England: Pearson/Longman, 2005). 
8
 From now on (unless otherwise noted) James II and James III refers to James II and III of 
England; also known as James VII and VIII of Scotland. The earlier references to James II 
and III referred only to the kings of Scotland.  
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could be, we will use a simple term; a Jacobite was anyone who believed that James II, later 
his son James Francis Edward Stuart, and his son Charles, were the rightful heir(s) to the 
British throne. Whether someone fought for the Jacobites for merely mercenary reasons, only 
talked about these men deserving the throne, or vehemently supported and fought for them as 
the natural kings of Britain, each person in either deed or sentiment is a Jacobite for our 
purpose. The extent to which each individual supported the Jacobites was important and will 
be discussed later during the different rebellions (in addition see chapter 6), but for now, a 
Jacobite was anyone who believed that James II and his sons were the natural rulers of 
Britain. Therefore, for this chapter, with the goal of building the context of the 1719 
rebellion, the Jacobite movement will begin in 1688 when James II lost the throne to William 
of Orange.
9
  
Who supported the Jacobites? 
In many cases from 1688-1745, the fortunes of a person determined who could be a 
Jacobite. If someone was an influential person in parliament, but then fell out of power, they 
became a potential Jacobite and often times were willing to help the Jacobites so long as they 
saw it to their advantage. Lord Bolingbroke and the Earl of Oxford were just two examples. 
Viscount St John (Bolingbroke) and Robert Harley (Oxford) were two high-ranking members 
of the British government during the War of Spanish Succession. Bolingbroke became 
Secretary of State under Queen Anne and helped arrange peace talks between France and 
Britain ending their respective roles in the War of Spanish Succession. Oxford became Lord 
High Treasurer and an influential member of Queen Anne’s court. Both men fell out of favor 
once the Whigs and later George I ascended to power. In 1714, Oxford was sent to the Tower 
of London and in 1715 Bolingbroke was brought up on charges of treason for his contact and 
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correspondence with James and the Jacobites (although many members of parliament were in 
contact with the Jacobites once Anne died). Bolingbroke instead fled the country to France, 
where he joined the Jacobite court and became James’s Secretary of State.  
The same was true of people in large amounts of debt. If someone held large debts to 
the British Government or to London merchants loyal to the government, then they were 
likely to support the Jacobites. The prospect of opposing the current government and 
obtaining favor from a new one was an important reason why the rebellion was successful in 
Scotland among the lower classes (along with the clan relationship). During the 1690s, poor 
weather caused several years of famine and poor crops in Scotland.
10
 Many more people 
became impoverished and were desperate for help. After the Act(s) of Union in 1707, only a 
small portion of merchants received any benefit from the Union. In fact, the Act of Union 
hurt many smaller entrepreneurs. Previously Scottish merchants sold goods to France and 
other markets, but because Britain had been at war with France, Scottish merchants were no 
longer able to sell their products to their usual markets. The economy in Scotland during the 
early eighteenth century stagnated and soon declined.
11
 Later in the century, the benefit of the 
Union was evident in places like Glasgow and Edinburgh, whose business boomed, but 
between 1700 and 1719 there was little benefit to the average Scotsman. Many people saw 
the Union as a way for Scotland to inherit the debt of the British government (which had 
grown substantially since William took the throne). The Union was so unpopular that in 1713 
it fell four votes short of being disbanded.
12
 By 1714, people in Scotland were ready to 
support something or someone who was willing to help them.  
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The Glory Less Revolution 
 Much debate surrounds the 1688 revolution. For a long time the “Whig” perspective 
of British history presented it as a bloodless coup that overthrew a tyrant. This view still 
holds true in some circles, but more recently, there has been a successful attempt to 
reconstruct the turmoil and bloodshed that occurred during the “Glorious” revolution.13 
Before we get to this point of rupture, however, we must examine Britain under James II’s 
rule. When James II inherited the British throne in 1685, it was a turbulent era with politics 
and religion at the forefront of most conflicts. During the reign of Charles II, the Tories and 
Whigs, the two main political parties of the time who were often on opposing sides of the 
political spectrum, were battling for a common goal; a parliament with tighter control of the 
government.
14
 Charles was well aware of parliament’s ambitions during his reign, but with 
the success of his taxation of English merchants, he needed little help from parliament and 
never conceded his power in exchange for money from parliament. He was also aware of the 
problems religion played in his realm and the conflicts that would emerge with a Catholic 
leading a Protestant kingdom. Charles possessed the political skill and savvy necessary to 
rule under those turbulent times. More specifically he knew how to keep all the vying powers 
equal and never let any drastic change go through Parliament too quickly; including an 
attempt to prevent his brother form taking the throne. James II, however, possessed few of the 
same qualities. Although he was a good leader of men, James was set in his ways, devoted to 
his beliefs, and supported (Christian) religious toleration so long as that religion’s followers 
supported him. After another unsuccessful attempt to seize the throne from him, Charles 
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feared for the future of the kingdom, “I am weary of traveling, and am resolved to go abroad 
no more. But when I am dead and gone, I know not what my brother (James II) will do: I am 
much afraid that when he comes to wear the crown he will be obliged to travel again.”15 
Charles was ultimately unsure of the fate of his brother’s future kingdom. 
 In 1685 shortly after inheriting the throne James II fought against the Monmouth 
Rebellion; an attempt by James Scott, the Duke of Monmouth, an illegitimate son of Charles 
II to take the British throne. Monmouth landed in England with a small force of loyal Dutch 
followers and attempted to start a rebellion in Western England (an area thought to be loyal to 
Protestantism and likely to rebel against a Catholic King). In response, James collected 
money to raise an army and successfully put down the rebellion. The money normally needed 
to be approved by parliament, but in this case James received the money without parliament’s 
approval. It was eventually approved after the rebellion was put down.
 16
 Within three years, 
what appeared like a logical solution of raising funds to defend the country was turned 
against the king. Whig members of parliament along with a few Tories claimed that this was 
an example of James expressing absolute power and in doing so he disregarded parliament’s 
authority and the voice of the people.
17
 By 1688, this was not the only problem facing James 
from parliament. 
Politically, James had problems with parliament, but he had even more problems with 
his religion. Both Whigs and Tories feared James II’s actions regarding religion. By 1687, 
after the challenges to its authority during the civil war the Church of England had come to 
                                                          
15
 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 53. 
16
  John Fortescue and John Fortescue-Aland, The Difference between an Absolute and 
Limited Monarchy; As It More Particularly Regards the English Constitution (London: 
Printed by W. Bowyer, for E. Parker, and T. Ward, 1714). According to this treatise, written 
in the fifteenth century, parliament and its ability to provide the king with finances is what 
made England (Britain) different from France and an absolute monarchy. If a king side 
stepped parliament he became absolute.  
17
 George Hilton Jones, The Main Stream of Jacobitism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1954), 3-4; Cruickshanks, The Glorious Revolution, 15-20. 
18 
 
dominate religion in England and Protestantism (Anglicanism) in its various forms was 
preferred to Catholicism. Since James was a Catholic, there were always fears about his 
loyalty to England. During his short reign, James lessened the restrictions on Catholics, 
opening up access to government positions previously denied to them. In 1687, James began 
a “movement” to repeal the Test Acts (which limited religious freedom/toleration) and in turn 
offered what was close to freedom of religion in Britain.
18
 The toleration that James wanted 
in England (albeit for his advantage), was feared by those in parliament and the British 
government. James also started lessening the privileges of the Church of England thus 
alienating many of his conservative and Tory supporters.
19
 This alienation of his supporters 
and the attempts to repeal the Test Acts were what started the end to his reign, but religion 
was not the only problem.  
What furthered parliament’s fears and led many historians to reflect negatively on 
James was his belief in his divine right, the idea that the monarch answers only to God. This 
idea had not begun with James II, but began with James I (of England) and VI and was 
carried on by his heirs. Many advisors during his reign and subsequent historians blamed 
James for losing the throne because of his refusal to convert to Protestantism. It was his 
devotion, however, that made James II, despite his many flaws, esteemed by his followers. 
Many times he was offered the return of the British throne, for himself and later for his son 
(James Francis Edward Stuart), if he just converted to Protestantism. James, however, stuck 
to what he believed and declined every time. What today might seem an easy choice to 
convert with the toleration we have for both faiths, in James II’s time was blasphemous. It is 
admirable that he stuck to his beliefs even if it meant costing him one thing he wanted 
                                                          
18
 Scott Sowerby, Making Toleration: The Repealers and the Glorious Revolution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
19
 Cruickshanks, The Glorious Revolution, 16-18. 
 19 
 
dearly.
20
 Not all Britons, however, felt the same way. Steve Pincus has argued that many 
viewed James’s religious policy and other bureaucratic policies as attempts to bring the 
British state closer to an absolutist monarchy much like in France under Louis XIV.
21
 
By 1687, discontent with James had grown, but Parliament and the public tolerated 
him as long as policies remained the same (as long as the Test Acts were not repealed). James 
was aged and had no male successor, the differences between James and parliament appeared 
to be ending shortly because once James II died his Protestant daughters would inherit the 
throne, and this likely would have ended any attempt for more toleration of and privileges 
granted for Catholics. When his wife Mary of Modena unexpectedly gave birth to a son the 
future James III in 1688, and following his baptism as a Roman Catholic, the toleration ended 
and discontent among Whig and Tory supporters grew again.
22
 With the birth of James 
Francis Edward Stuart, rumors of a Popish plot against England reappeared. One in particular 
said that James Francis Edward Stuart was not actually the king and queen’s child but was an 
orphan smuggled in to secure the king’s line of succession. One logical place for this rumor 
to have started in was Holland.
23
 William of Orange, who was married to Mary Stuart 
(James’s daughter) the next in line to the British throne after the newly born James Francis 
Edward Stuart, began planning an invasion of Britain once word of Mary of Modena’s 
pregnancy reached him in 1687. It was very likely that he or his followers created such a 
rumor to help support Mary’s claim to the throne.24 By 1688 parliament grew tired of James, 
and invited William of Orange into England to compete with James for the crown. What 
began as a challenge to James II intended to force him to back down and give into 
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parliament’s demands turned into the “Glorious” Revolution and the seizure of the throne by 
William of Orange.  
William of Orange’s arrival in England on November 5, 1688 marks the beginning of 
the Jacobite movement. For the next few weeks, James stuck around London waiting to see 
what resolutions there were, but neither he nor parliament was willing to capitulate (James 
did agree to change a few laws but these were seen as feigned attempts to please parliament). 
As William and his army marched towards London, James attempted to flee.
25
 He was 
stopped at the coast by fishermen and returned back to London in December.
26
 Upon his 
return, James received a warm welcome in London by the people. William, afraid of the 
public support for James, pushed on into the capital to quash the support. James soon fled to 
France with the memories of his father’s execution in the back of his mind.27 Within a few 
months, William, assisted by both the Whig and the Tory members of parliament who were 
eager to see his arrival in England, successfully took control of London.
28
 In the end, William 
and parliament came together and during the next nine years, he opened up the British 
treasury to fight his nemesis Louis XIV.
29
 Although William had a strong hold on the center 
of power in London by early 1689, the battle for the crown of the three kingdoms was by no 
means over. During the next three years, the battlefield determined the winner in the fight for 
the three kingdoms. 
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Scottish and Irish Campaigns 
James returned to fight for his crown in Ireland in 1689 with troops from Louis XIV 
and support from Irish recruits. While James fought in Ireland, John Graham Viscount of 
Dundee led a rebellion in Scotland. The plan was to have James quickly end the war in 
Ireland and then send his army over to Scotland before William assembled his men and 
prevented James from taking Ireland. Initially this plan appeared successful. Dundee raised 
the Jacobite standard and several of the clans and wealthier estate men came out to support 
James II.  The Jacobite forces under Dundee quickly seized Edinburgh castle but they only 
held it for a brief period. A series of light raids took place under the command of Dundee 
while the main Jacobite army assembled and awaited orders from James. On July 27, 1689, 
the Jacobite and the Williamite (English/British army) met at Killiecrankie. The Jacobite 
army squandered several opportunities to win the battle, but finally took the field once 
Dundee ordered the highlanders to charge.
30
 The soldiers in the Williamite army consisted of 
many fresh recruits and became intimidated by the highlanders charging at them with their 
broadswords drawn. The victory was bittersweet, however, as Dundee died during the 
fighting, and with him died any effective Jacobite leadership. The last of the Jacobites laid 
down their arms in 1694, but the war in Scotland effectively ended after Dundee’s death at 
Killiecrankie. Without him, the Jacobites struggled to find an effective leader.
31
 
In Ireland, James and his army also had the upper hand in the beginning. The 
Jacobites held many of the major towns in Ireland, and by March 1689, only parts of northern 
Ireland remained out of Jacobite control. The only major port for William and his army to 
land at was Londonderry, so its possession was vital for both sides.
32
 If the Jacobites quickly 
conquered Ireland they could send troops into Scotland to help Dundee, but it was here in 
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northern Ireland where things went downhill for the Jacobites. James II’s army in Ireland had 
the support of many locals; however, this support consisted of a majority of Catholic 
followers. In most of the country, this was not a major problem, but in northern Ireland, 
which had a large Protestant population, this created tensions between the army and the local 
population. For much of the seventeenth century, each religious group persecuted the other in 
some way, creating a strong mistrust amongst the other. Trying to convince the northern 
Protestants that there would be no retribution proved challenging, and a large Protestant 
population feared for their lives.
33
 The citizens of Londonderry believed that James and his 
Catholic supporters would kill all the Protestants in the city: a belief promoted by Williamite 
propaganda because James had lost the throne in part because he was too supportive of 
Catholics. The Jacobites besieged Londonderry despite inferior numbers, failed to break 
through, and consequently withdrew.
 34
 With a port in the north, William landed his troops in 
Ireland and both sides prepared for a major campaign in 1690.
35
   
In July 1690 at the battle of Boyne, James’s army was defeated and soon the defeats 
poured on his army like a summer storm. Despite some limited success by Patrick Sarsfield at 
Limerick, the Jacobites went on the defensive and in 1692, the Jacobites and the Irish reached 
a peace agreement with William.
36
 James left Ireland and returned to France before the peace 
was signed leaving many of his soldiers to fend for themselves. This angered several of his 
supporters who felt betrayed by James’s quick departure. Some historians including Charles 
Petrie argued that Irish Catholic resentment at James II’s early departure and their suffering at 
                                                          
33
 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 89; Whyte, On the Trail of the Jacobites, 17-18. 
34
 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 90-91.  
35
 Interesting to note, the Duke of Ormonde actually came out in support of William during 
the Ireland campaigns of 1689-1692. It was not until after the war of Spanish Succession that 
Ormonde switched to the Jacobites; Faithful Memoirs of the Life and Actions of James 
Butler, Late Duke of Ormonde (London: W. Shropshire, 1732), 13. 
36
 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 84; For more information on Sarsfield see page 98-103 of 
Petrie. 
 23 
 
the hands of following the rebellion in the 1690s explains why the Irish remained relatively 
inactive for the rest of the Jacobite period.
37
 
After James left Ireland, the Stuarts would never again control their invasion attempts 
(or at least have a decisive say in their planning or execution). From 1692 on, they had to rely 
on foreign aid to assist them. As for James’s supporters, many of them left for the continent. 
Irish soldiers, later known as the wild geese, served in the French army. Some Scottish 
soldiers also served in the French army and others served in Spain. Still others followed 
James II to France at St-Germain-en-Laye, where Louis XIV welcomed them.  For the next 
few years, the Jacobite movement remained relatively quiet and sent no more armies to 
invade Britain. Jacobite plotters conceived a few other attempts during the rest of James II’s 
life, including two assassination attempts of William III in 1695 and 1696. The 1696 
assassination attempt of William was an elaborate plan that involved attacking William’s 
carriage while he was awaiting a ferry to cross the River Thames during one of his usual 
hunting trips. After assassinating William, the plotters were supposed to have led a Jacobite 
rebellion in England and invite James to the throne. The plan, however, like many other 
Jacobite attempts was discovered beforehand by British intelligence and an admission by a 
Jacobite, Thomas Prendergrass.
38
 Ultimately, William avoided danger because he did not go 
out for his hunting trips. The conspirators were later hanged, but not before they admitted to 
the plot and gave a detailed description of their plans. Their confessions were shocking not 
because of their objective, but because of how well it was planned out and how close it came 
to succeeding (at least in assassinating William). How much James was involved in the 1696 
assassination plot is unclear, but this was the last major attempt to reclaim the throne by the 
Jacobites during James II’s life. When James II died in 1701, the “British” throne passed on 
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to his son, James Francis Edward Stuart (who would have been James III). Mary Stuart, 
James II’s daughter died of smallpox in 1694 and William ruled until his death in a riding 
accident in 1702. Upon William’s death, Anne Stuart, James II’s youngest daughter became 
queen and ruled until her death in 1714.  
James Francis Edward Stuart, the Act of Union, and the 1708 Rebellion 
 In 1708, the Jacobites prepared another attempt to invade Britain. After the passage of 
the Act(s) of Union in 1707, Scotland was perceived by the Jacobites to be ripe for rebellion. 
With Britain and France on opposing sides in the War of Spanish Succession (see chapter 
three), a Jacobite rebellion was advantageous to France’s goals on the European continent. 
Plans developed to send 6,000 French troops to Scotland and join a Scottish Jacobite army 
upon their arrival.
39
 By February 1708, the ships were ready to depart when James Francis 
Edward Stuart came down with measles, delaying the expedition until March. In March, 
strong winds pushed a British blockade away from the French fleet clearing the way to 
Scotland. While off the Scottish coast, the French admirals saw little support from the 
Scottish Jacobites and refused to land. Ian and Kathleen Whyte argued that the French 
refused to land because George Byng of the Royal Navy was not too far behind the French 
fleet, and had the French attempted to land troops, their ships would have been caught in a 
vulnerable position.
40
 Other historians such as Charles Petrie argued that the British paid off 
the French admirals who deliberately delayed the expedition and refused to land in 
Scotland.
41
 Both scenarios were possible as corruption was a problem for any military in the 
eighteenth century, and the British fleet was just as likely to have made haste to catch the 
French fleet as soon as the storm passed. Regardless of why it happened, the French failed to 
land troops in Scotland and the rebellion never got off the ground. James was reluctant to see 
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the invasion fail and pleaded with the French admirals to let him sail by himself to Scotland 
and lead the rebellion. The French admirals refused, most likely because his direct 
involvement was not in the best interest of France: if the Pretender (James Francis Edward 
Stuart) were to die with no heir, France would have lost a huge bargaining chip in the War of 
Spanish Succession.  
George I and The Fifteen  
 By 1714, the Whigs had again secured a majority in parliament and upon Anne’s 
death, they sent an invitation to George the Elector of Hanover to become the next British 
monarch as George I. Before Anne died, she dismissed Robert Harley, Lord High Treasurer 
and Earl of Oxford and replaced him with Viscount St. John Bolingbroke (thanks in no large 
part to Bolingbroke’s insistence that she do so). Oxford and Bolingbroke had a tense 
relationship by the end of Anne’s reign with both men in contact with the Jacobites and both 
men trying to secure a high position in James’s new government should he become king.42  
Oxford went to the tower in 1715, once George I became king, where he remained for two 
years. After he fell out of favor with Anne and the new Whig government, Oxford is believed 
to have been an important figure in the Jacobite movement, but the extent to which he was 
involved is still uncertain. Several times during the planning of the 1719 rebellion Ormonde 
mentioned a Lord of Oxford as the informant and person responsible for telling the Jacobites 
the possible landing locations in England. Considering there is no Lord of Oxford, it makes 
sense to believe that Ormonde referred to Robert Harley the Earl of Oxford. With Oxford 
having such close ties to the British government, it is safe to assume that he knew of weak 
defensive areas in Britain, and if this is true he was a valuable ally to the Jacobites. 
 After Anne died, the Whigs moved quickly, placing George I on the British throne. 
Before Anne’s death, the Tories were leaning more towards James and the Jacobites, but just 
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as in previous years, the Tories were disorganized and moved too slowly and the Whigs beat 
them to it.
43
 George’s accession to the throne was seemingly smooth. There were small 
localized protests took place in many towns and a larger organized protest occurred in 
Oxford.
44
 These protests were a sign of future events.   
 George I was not well-received by the British public during the first years of his reign 
due in large part to actions of the British government during the past few years and in some 
places bad harvests. The Sacheverell riots of 1710 and the following riots of 1714 and 1715 
attest to this. Henry Sacheverell preached a sermon at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London where 
he condemned the state of the current government and the state of the church.
45  
Sacheverell 
was later put on trial for high treason and riots broke out during the trial. Although these riots 
were during the trial, the targets of many of rioters were religious dissenters. Later riots 
claiming to be associated in the name of Sacheverell in 1715 have also been attributed to food 
riots because of poor harvests the previous two years.
46
 Other riots during 1714-1715 
occurred on birthdays of George I, the Duke of Ormonde, James Francis Edward Stuart, and 
Charles I and on anniversaries of George I’s accession, Charles I’s execution, and the 
restoration of Charles II. These were all in response to the accession of George I.
47
 Also 
working against George was his poor ability to speak English and spending half his time in 
Hanover which further distanced him from his subjects. Others in Scotland who were not 
merchants were still upset with the Act of Union seeing it as a way for Scotland to carry the 
burden of English debt. Early on, a portion of the population had already grown tired of 
George I (albeit a largely Jacobite portion).
 
For much of 1714 after Anne died and 1715, riots 
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took place in western England. This was in response to the changing of the British 
government from Tory to Whig. The west had a large Tory following, many riots took place 
protesting this change in government, and consequently the accession of George I.
48
 By 1715, 
the Jacobites began organizing another rebellion to put James back on the throne. James 
Butler, the Duke of Ormonde, led the major rebellion in western England, and a smaller 
diversion under the control of John Erskine the Earl of Mar took place in Scotland.
49
 Mar is 
often ridiculed for his role in the fifteen, earning the nickname “Bobbing John” because of his 
slow movements and “weak” character.50 He spent much of his life serving the British 
government in Scotland. Upon the accession of George I, Mar found his services no longer 
needed and offered his services to the Pretender. Before the rebellion fully developed, the 
British government learned of plans for the rebellion in England, in the fall of 1715 sent 
reinforcements to the west, and started searching for Ormonde. Ormonde, who had been in 
charge of British forces in Spain and the Spanish Netherlands during the War of Spanish 
Succession, left western England for France once he learned that the British government had 
charged him with treason by a vote of 234-187.
51
 Without any leader, the rebellion in the 
west soon died down, but the Scottish rebellion gained momentum. With the failure of the 
English rebellion (which was supposed to be the main rebellion), the attention of the 
Jacobites turned to Scotland.  
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The 1715 rebellion was probably the best funded and supported rebellion of all the 
Jacobite Rebellions.
52
 The Jacobites had the aid of several European powers during the 
rebellion. France assembled a fleet to help the Jacobites, but it had to do so discreetly because 
of the treaty they signed after the War of Spanish Succession, which considered France 
aiding the Jacobites as an act of war against Britain. Louis XIV was still willing to put 
together a small group of forces once the opportunity presented itself, but he wanted to see 
that the Jacobites had a chance at winning before he openly joined the fight. Spain also 
became involved in the rebellion by sending money to the Jacobites, and Spain and France 
worked together hoping to send troops and supplies to the Jacobites. The problem with the 
Spanish help was that Philip V waited on France to join before Spain sent any troops and 
when Louis XIV died during the rebellion in 1715 and the Regent (the Duc d’Orleans) took 
control of the country France shifted strategy. Under the Regent, the French crown reneged 
on its commitments the Jacobites and did not change its position until the Jacobites held a 
clear advantage over the British. The Jacobites’ advantage, however, was short lived; the 
opportunity was lost and the French fleet never left the harbor. Spain tried to help by sending 
a transport ship with money to aid the rebellion, but the ship sank before it reached 
Scotland.
53
 
The Scottish Campaign 
The Jacobite forces began assembling in early September 1715 and Mar possessed a 
large army of 5,000 supporters of clansman that slowly grew in number. For much of 1715 
Mar’s army outnumbered his adversary’s the Duke of Argyll.54 Despite his advantages, Mar 
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failed to act on the opportunities presented to him. Mar waited at Perth for all his forces to 
arrive before he made any major moves, but in doing so the advantage he had was lost and 
the Hanoverian forces reinforced many of the major towns, including Edinburgh and Stirling, 
which then proved invulnerable to siege.
55
 Mar and some of his smaller raiding parties took 
Inverness, Dundee, and Aberdeen along with a few other smaller cities and strongholds, but 
Mar failed to take full advantage of his early strength and this gave the British government 
time to strengthen their forces in Scotland. In November Mar and the Jacobite forces met up 
with the Duke of Argyll and the British forces at the battle of Sheriffmuir. Mar had an 
advantage in troops, outnumbering Argyll by two or three to one. During the battle, Mar 
trapped Argyll’s forces, but failed to push forward the attack and let Argyll escape.56 In the 
following months, British reinforcements arrived in Scotland and Argyll’s forces came to 
outnumber Mar’s. By the time James arrived in Scotland and met up with the Jacobite forces 
in January 1716, the rebellion was all but lost. Mar squandered any advantage he had in troop 
strength and draws on the battlefield were costly for the Jacobite army’s morale, and proved 
the undoing of the army. The troops were largely volunteers and free to come and go as they 
pleased. As things went poorly on the battlefield, the Jacobite troops slowly disappeared and 
went back to their homes.
57
 In February, James realized the cause was lost and sailed away 
from Scotland for France. Charles Petrie among other historians blames Mar for the failure of 
the rebellion because of his inaction during the early stages of the rebellion. Petrie, however, 
felt that the rebellion was doomed to fail from the start because Mar was the leader and 
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because there was no effective general among the Jacobite hierarchy.
58
 He stated, “never did 
the wrong man appear at the wrong time so completely as in the case of Mar in September 
1715.”59 
Other historians have put blame on the duke of Ormonde for the failure of the 1715 
rebellion. Winston Churchill found very few good qualities in Ormonde, but this dealt more 
with what happened in the War of Spanish Succession (see chapter three). This negative 
perspective of Ormonde has carried through to modern day. At the time, however, no blame 
fell on Ormonde. Even James did not blame Ormonde. He stated that Ormonde was not at 
fault for leaving England but had surrounded himself with poor advisors who gave him 
incorrect advice.
 60
 In fact, James blamed himself for the failure of the English rebellion 
stating that he was not there to guide Ormonde and give him the proper advice on what to 
do.
61
 So too, Bolingbroke who had become the secretary of state of for the Jacobites said 
Ormonde was not at all to blame for the failure of the rebellion.
62
 
The Failure of The Fifteen and the Aftermath 
 After the failure of the fifteen many Jacobites were held in captivity, executed 
(hanged, drawn, and quartered), or fled Britain for the continent to places such as France, 
Spain, and Russia. James, who was already unwelcome in France, searched for a new home. 
France allowed James’s advisors to stay in France in St Germain, but the old pretender had to 
leave and eventually moved to Rome, accepting an invitation from Pope Clement XI. 
Ormonde and Mar traveled with James and looked to find support from other countries for 
the next Jacobite Rebellion. Ormonde went to Sweden and secured the support of the 
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Swedish government for a rebellion in 1717, but the British government caught wind of this 
before anything was ever launched. Nevertheless, ties between the two (Sweden and the 
Jacobites) had been created. The relationship between the two was important for the 
formation of the 1719 rebellion. 
 After failing in the fifteen, James dismissed Bolingbroke (who had been secretary of 
state for the Jacobites), in part because of his poor ability to keep secrets to himself.
63
 Mar 
became his replacement. For the next few years it was up to Mar and Ormonde to string 
together any new attempt to bring James back to the British throne. Both men eagerly sought 
out a new ally and Spain proved willing. The two sides were in close contact during the 1715 
rebellion and the connections made between each side in 1715 and during the War of Spanish 
Succession were vital to the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. One man in particular, Cardinal Giulio 
Alberoni proved to be a vital ally for the Jacobites. While the Jacobites were attempting to 
recover the throne, the rest of Europe, especially Spain, was busy with their own battles. 
Chapter three provides a summary of the War of Spanish Succession and presents the 
connection between Spain and the Jacobites. The connection between the two sides that 
developed during the War of Spanish Succession can help to explain why in 1719 Spain 
helped the Jacobites. 
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 Chapter Three: Bon Cop de Falç 
            
Clearly, the Jacobites and James Francis Edward Stuart had reasons to attempt an 
invasion in Britain, but why did Spain risk a war with Britain to help the Jacobites? Chapter 
three answers this question through an analysis of Spanish political history at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century. In many ways, the reasons Spain decided to join the Jacobites were 
based upon power, prestige, and European dominance. By the eighteenth century, Spain faced 
threats from Britain in all these areas.  
For much of the early modern period, Spain was the leader of Europe. It controlled a 
vast empire and was the richest country in the world with gold and silver shipments running 
annually from its possessions in the Americas. During the seventeenth century, however, 
Spain’s enemies gained a foothold in the European power struggle. The Dutch began 
dominating European trade, France under Louis XIV possessed a powerful army to rival 
Spain, and England began challenging Spain’s position in the New World. Over the course of 
the century, Spain lost land, wealth, prestige, and power. By the start of the eighteenth 
century, Spain was no longer a major power of Europe and was in danger of being broken up 
into pieces of other empires. King Charles II was the last of the Spanish Habsburg rulers. He 
died heirless in 1700 igniting a major European conflict for control of the Spanish Empire. 
This conflict known as The War of Spanish Succession, or Queen Anne’s War as it was 
known in America, pitted two sides against each other with one supporting Philip of Anjou 
(Philip V) and the other supporting Charles VI of Austria (Charles III of Spain). Ultimately, 
Philip V won out, and the War of Spanish Succession in turn created a stronger Spain.
 64
 The 
war renewed the spirit of Spaniards and strengthened the internal bureaucracy and industry of 
Spain. To contemporaries it appeared as though the low sun on the horizon was rising again 
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for the Spanish empire. For the Jacobites, a strong Spain meant a new ally in their battle to 
retake the British throne.   
The King is Dead, Long Live the King? 
Spain at the end of the seventeenth century was a shadow of its former self. The once 
strong and powerful empire was being bled dry by the economic strains of its vast empire. 
The government depended upon the gold and silver shipments from America and any delay 
of these shipments created panic in Spanish markets. Internally Spain was in bad shape too. A 
complete lack of domestic industry left the country relying upon imports for many products 
vital to running an empire such as gunpowder, cloth, and timber for ships. Maritime trade was 
vital to all of the European powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the 
Spanish navy failed to support or protect merchant vessels adequately. The Spanish Navy 
spent most of its resources protecting the gold and silver trade from the Americas. During the 
War of Spanish Succession, however, Spain could not even protect this trade and relied upon 
French assistance.
65
 Despite its weakened status, Spain still controlled large territories in 
Europe, had an input in European affairs, and was valued as a trading partner. The Habsburg 
dynasty had been ruling Spain since the start of the sixteenth century. Charles II of Spain, 
who was plagued by health problems his whole life, was unable to produce an heir. In the 
event that he died heirless, many promises and signed treaties were made to assign his throne. 
Charles produced a will in 1696 naming the prince of Bavaria as the future king of Spain, and 
by 1698, much of Europe agreed to this.
66
 The unexpected death of the prince of Bavaria in 
1699 threw a wrench in the plans yet again. On October 2, 1700, Charles agreed to another 
will naming Philip of Anjou (closest in the line of succession) the grandson of Louis XIV as 
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the next king of Spain and its empire.
67
 In November 1700, Charles II died and Philip of 
Anjou became Philip V of Spain.  
 For France and Spain, the death of Charles was welcomed news. Louis XIV could use 
his grandson to help support France, and Louis strengthened France’s position in Europe by 
adding Spain’s military resources (or at least their potential resources) to his own. Philip 
became king of Spain, but the possibility still existed for him to head a new empire. If all of 
the French heirs died (as one of the two remaining did), Philip was next in line to inherit the 
French throne as well. For Spain, the death of Charles meant the end of a poor administration. 
During the last years of his reign, Charles stayed away from public life and left the everyday 
tasks of running the country in the hands of regents. The result was a country spiraling into 
deeper economic turmoil.
68
 
Meanwhile Britain (or what soon became Britain) and the Dutch trembled at the 
prospect of a united Bourbon (France and Spanish) Dynasty. Despite this, the initial transition 
of the new Spanish king went smoothly, at least in the Spanish empire. Philip took the throne 
and entered Madrid in February 1701. For a little over the next year much effort was spent by 
France and Spain to secure Philip’s position as king of Spain.69 A treaty with Portugal was 
established and it appeared as though Philip’s reign was set in place. In May 1702, the Grand 
Alliance of England (later Britain), the Dutch, German forces, Austria, and later Portugal 
(who switched from the Spanish side in 1703) declared war on France and Spain, igniting the 
War of Spanish Succession. Each side had their own reasons for war. England wanted more 
and better trade benefits with Spain. It also wanted to maintain a European balance of power; 
with no single country becoming more powerful than the rest (except for Britain). The 
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opportunity to trade in Spanish markets both in Europe and in the New World had intrigued 
many English merchants.
70
 The Dutch wanted land from France and were concerned with 
trade rights in Spain. The German forces fought mainly against Louis XIV and for Charles VI 
and III. Portugal was eager to fight against their arch rival Spain, if they had the proper 
support, and they all supported Austria and (the future) Charles VI of Austria who was 
crowned Charles III of Spain in 1703 in Vienna.
71
 After declaring war, Charles III went to 
England to gain the support and approval of his new allies.
 72
 
War Begins 
 In August 1702, the allies launched an expedition to take the Spanish port of Cadiz. 
The Duke of Ormonde commanded the infantry and Admiral George Rooke commanded the 
Royal Navy. During the attempted invasion, Ormonde and Rooke seldom agreed and 
constantly argued over how to support each other. Ormonde received little support from the 
navy, but still secured a beachhead. Ultimately, the expedition was a failure (despite small 
successes on the battlefield) because the support of the Spanish people in Cadiz and 
Andalucía was lost once the Anglo-Dutch army began looting, much to the chagrin of 
parliament.
73
 Rooke attempted to make up for his shortcomings at Cadiz and with the help of 
Ormonde attacked the Spanish treasure fleet later that year. Unfortunately for Rooke, the fleet 
contained little treasure, however, Rooke finally came through when he took Gibraltar in 
1704, but at the time, the allies thought Gibraltar to be useless because of its small port.
74
 
Ormonde did not fare as well. The Tories made him a hero but the Whigs blamed him for the 
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defeat at Cadiz.
 75
 He made enemies in parliament because of his men’s looting and his 
support from the Tories and did not receive another major commission in the war until 1712 
once the Whigs lost power. His time with the British army and government had essentially 
ended after this point in 1704, and once the Whigs returned to power and when George I 
became king, he lost any hope of advancement.
76
  
  In 1705 and 1706, the allies (Anglo-Dutch, Portuguese, and Austrian armies) began 
making progress in Spain. Parts of Catalonia were under their control and the allies occupied 
many major towns including Valencia and even Madrid. Charles III occupied Madrid for part 
of the spring and summer of 1706 but Philip’s army retook it later that summer. By 1707 the 
allies had lost their advantage, and much of Spain outside of the east coast was retaken and 
under the control of the Bourbon army. 1708 saw the war largely at a standstill, and at this 
point peace feelers were sent out by both sides. The allies were unwilling to yield and a 
slogan in Britain emerged stating “no peace without Spain.”77 The importance of trade with 
the Spanish empire fueled many British citizens’ thirst for war. Despite this, the allies in the 
peace negotiations pushed to have Philip deposed and replaced with the Duc d’Orleans, 
Philip’s uncle, who had no direct ties to the French throne.78 France also started removing its 
troops from Spain, which had comprised the bulk of the “Spanish” army. Once Philip learned 
of the plan to remove him, he began to resent the Duc d’Orleans and the connection between 
France and Spain was not as close after this point (some believed Louis XIV even toyed with 
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the idea of replacing Philip if it meant peace).
79
 Despite the talks, peace remained elusive and 
the war dragged on.  
 In 1710, the allies went on the offensive and took several major Spanish cities 
including Madrid again. Just as in 1706, the allies failed to hold on to their advantage and 
Philip retook Madrid with the help of French troops. Louis XIV was upset with the proposed 
peace negotiations and put his men back into France. He sent Louis-Joseph duc de Vendo  me 
to lead the French and Spanish troops. Shortly after Vendo  me went into battle, the Spanish 
and French started winning again.
80
 By 1711 under the command of Philip and Vendo  me, the 
French and Spanish army retook most of Spain except parts of Catalonia. Vendo  me became 
an important part of Philip’s cabinet and Vendo  me and Philip were in frequent contact with 
one another. In April 1711, Charles III’s brother, Joseph I, died leaving the Austrian and 
Holy Roman Empire open to him. Charles was hesitant to leave Spain because if he were to 
have left, it would almost have guaranteed the defeat of his cause in Spain since the rest of 
the allies had little desire to fight.
81
 In September, Charles agreed to leave Spain (Catalonia) 
and became Charles VI of Austria. By now, the allies were tired of the war and they no 
longer had a viable king. If the allies still backed Charles, who was now king of Austria, the 
balance of power in Europe was greatly upset and it created a new dynasty with Charles 
sitting on the throne of both Austria and Spain. At the onset of the war, Charles was not 
expected to become king of Austria and his claim to the throne would have gone to his 
brother’s heirs. Charles, however, did not give up his claim to the Spanish throne or to parts 
of the Spanish Empire in Italy until the 1720s. This unresolved problem led to Spain and 
Austria fighting in the War of the Quadruple Alliance.  
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Meanwhile, Britain had undergone a change in political strategy. In 1710, the Tory 
regime had taken power and was eager to end the war. The Duke of Ormonde’s career in the 
British army came to a less than stellar end. In 1712, Ormonde commanded the British troops 
in the Spanish Netherlands. The Tories already agreed to pull British troops out, but kept this 
secret from their allies.
82
 Ormonde pulled out the British army as his orders instructed.  This 
left the Dutch in a vulnerable position and the French soon overwhelmed the Dutch positions. 
Many historians including Winston Churchill blamed Ormonde for the Dutch defeat in 1712, 
but Ormonde was only following orders. Ormonde took most of the blame for this and he 
soon found himself with few friends in the British government. He was left out of the new 
government that took over once George I and the Whig’s came to power in 1715.83 For high-
ranking Tory members of the British government the new Whig regime was not too kind and 
some Tories like Ormonde, Bolingbroke, and Oxford switched over to the Jacobite cause. 
The Peace 
 In 1713, the war ended for most of the major parties involved. Britain was anxious to 
get out of the war. The Tories gained control of the government from the Whigs in 1710 and 
were eager to see the war end. The formality of the treaties still needed to be agreed upon, but 
the fighting was over (except in Catalonia) by 1712. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 gave 
Philip V Spain and the empire in the Indies, on the condition he gave up his claim to the 
French throne. France ceded territory in America to Britain, agreed to stop supporting James 
Francis Edward Stuart, and supported the Hanoverian succession of the British throne. This 
was a huge blow to the Jacobite cause. France had been supporting the Jacobites and James 
up to this point. After the Treaty of Utrecht, James had to find a new “home.”  
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The Dutch gained control of the Spanish Netherlands. This gave them a barrier against 
France and also helped Spain save money by not having to fund constant wars in the 
Netherlands. Britain was the most successful of all the countries. On top of the territory it 
gained from France in North America it obtained access to Spanish trade and gained limited 
access to Spanish ports in the Americas. Britain also thought it increased its stability since 
Louis XIV had agreed not to support James Francis Edward Stuart any longer, but the 
Jacobite rebellion of 1715 proved this calculation incorrect. Both sides had Spain and 
Portugal create its own peace agreements and eventually Spain and Portugal made peace. 
Charles III (VI) and Austria did not agree to the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht and because of 
this the war between Spain and Austria remained ongoing even though there was no 
fighting.
84
 In 1714, France and Austria signed the Treaty of Rastatt. This gave to Austria 
certain Italian provinces including Sardinia. Spain was not involved in these negotiations and 
did not sign the treaty.
85
 This further angered Spain and Austria and the war lingered on 
between them. All sides were tired of war, however, and the results of the War of Spanish 
Succession at its conclusion in 1713 were no different from the peace terms offered in 1707. 
The original conflicts of trade and balance of power were never fully resolved. The war had 
ended because Britain and France had grown tired of fighting. Yet, the other participants still 
had unresolved problems and the door was open to any event starting a new conflict, 
especially between Austria and Spain. 
After the war 
 Following the War of Spanish Succession in the years 1715-1719, Spain began to 
reemerge as an important power. The origins of this revitalization began during the war once 
French troops and supplies left Spain in 1707 and 1708.
86
 France had supplied most of 
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Spain’s military goods up to this point in the war, but after France withdrew its troops Spain 
began relying on its own products and retooled its industry to fit its needs.
87
 By war’s end, 
Spain had not yet recovered, but it emerged with the potential to become one of the next big 
powers in Europe (again). Internally the country was unified. Philip V had the loyalty of his 
people (Catalonia being the exception) and if the economy continued to improve like it had 
during the war, Spain could reacquire what it lost from the Treaty of Rastatt. In 1715, newly 
appointed Spanish Prime Minister Giulio Alberoni was just the man for the job and started 
planning the return of Spain to its former glory.  
Alberoni was born in 1664 and grew up in Piacenza near Parma, Italy where he 
became a priest. A description from 1719 portrayed him with a very unflattering physical 
appearance. In fact, he had no physical beauty whatsoever, but what was important were his 
good deeds and undying support for the betterment of Spain. More importantly, however, was 
his ambition.
88
 In 1702, Alberoni worked in the church with the Bishop of St. Donnin who 
oversaw the towns of Parma and Piacenza. During the War of Spanish Succession, the Bishop 
and Alberoni (because of his ability to speak French) worked with Louis-Joseph duc de 
Vendo  me, commander of French troops in Italy. The relationship between Alberoni and 
Vendo  me helped jumpstart Alberoni’s political career. Later in the war, Vendo  me was sent to 
Spain to lead the French troops there. Vendo  me, who was the cousin of Philip V, was 
successful in his military exploits, and he and Philip often worked together. Alberoni slowly 
became involved in courtly affairs because of his close connection with Vendo  me and later 
with Philip.
89
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 Upon the death of Philip V’s wife Maria Luisa of Savoy in 1714, Alberoni saw an 
opportunity. Growing up near Parma, Alberoni knew of the daughter of the Duke of Parma, 
Elisabeth Farnese. Because of his influential position in the court of Philip V, Alberoni 
suggested Farnese as a potential wife for Philip. The alliance of the two families would help 
strengthen Philip’s position in Italy. After all, he had just lost territory there to Austria 
through the Treaty of Rastatt. In 1714, Philip and Farnese were married and Alberoni 
remained attached closely to both, becoming the confessor of Farnese. Shortly after the 
marriage, Alberoni became prime minister of Spain in 1715. This jump may appear 
surprising, but Spain went through many French Prime Ministers during the war and Philip 
was eager to work with someone who was not French. Shortly thereafter, the Pope made 
abbot Alberoni a Cardinal at the insistence of Elisabeth Farnese.
90
 While in office, Cardinal 
Alberoni implemented new economic policies similar to those developed by Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert prime minister of France in the late seventeenth century. Alberoni realized the 
importance of maritime trade and saw how successfully the allies against Spain used it during 
the war. To help improve the maritime trade he eliminated several customhouses and trade 
restrictions imposed by previous governments.
91
 His most important policies, which kept him 
in the good graces of Philip V, were those that damaged the Austrian Empire and helped 
expand the Spanish Empire in the Mediterranean.
92
  
The Causes United 
During the War of Spanish Succession, many Jacobites fought in the ranks of the 
Spanish or French armies including members of the Wild Geese. Some had even participated 
in the defense of Gibraltar.
93
 Others were in Portugal keeping close tabs on Pedro II, whose 
                                                          
90
 De Missy, The History of Cardinal Alberoni, 88-91.  
91
 Williams, Stanhope, 282.  
92
 De Missy, The History of Cardinal Alberoni, 98-101. 
93
 Francis, The First Peninsular War, 105-140.  
42 
 
wife became regent after his stroke.
94
 The Jacobites entrenched themselves in Spain before 
the War of Spanish Succession, but the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion was the first time Spain 
became directly albeit discreetly involved in the Jacobite campaigns (see chapter 2). Philip V 
and Louis XIV were keen to weaken Britain and the 1715 rebellion offered a good 
opportunity they needed. The terms of the treaty of Utrecht, however, made it impossible for 
them to support the Jacobites directly. Louis XIV was willing to risk involvement but only if 
it would not came back to harm France. Therefore, both Spain and France waited until the 
Jacobites looked as though they could win before they joined the fight. By the time France 
assembled a fleet it was too late, the rebellion was over and George I retained the British 
throne.  
In1717, James began residing in Italy and stayed in contact with Cardinal Alberoni. 
The two men most likely became acquainted during Alberoni’s time serving with Vend me 
during the War of Spanish Succession. By the war’s end Alberoni began traveling to France 
to interact with the French cabinet (with James being aware of what went on there) on behalf 
of Spain and Vend me. 95 The two were also both Catholics, friends of Cardinal Aquaviva 
who, as we will later see, was with James in Rome while the 1719 rebellion was being 
planned, and friends of (and had the support of) Pope Clement XI. It is not exactly clear when 
Alberoni and James first met, but by 1715 the two had at least became aware of the others 
value to their own cause. Alberoni supported the Jacobites during the fifteen and James later 
returned the favor in 1717, when Abbott Alberoni was being considered to become Cardinal 
Alberoni, by putting in a good word to Pope Clement XI on Alberoni’s behalf.96  
In the meantime, with James in Italy, the Jacobites had been searching for a partner to 
help fund an attempt to restore James Stuart to the British throne. Ormonde first went north to 
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Russia and then to Sweden after the failed rebellion in 1715. During the War of Spanish 
Succession Ormonde had spent time in Russia as a diplomat working for the allies, and 
therefore, it was a likely place for Ormonde to start. He next tried his luck in Sweden, who 
was fighting an ongoing war against Hanover among others, and almost succeeded in putting 
together an invasion of Britain in 1717. Finally, after Charles VI and Austria arrested the 
Grand Inquisitor of Spain and created a war between the two countries and after the Royal 
Navy engaged the Spanish Mediterranean fleet in August 1718, the two separate causes of the 
Jacobites and Spain aligned as one. With Britain standing in the way of a new European 
Spanish empire, Spain sought an ally to help it neutralize the new Hanoverian monarch and 
the Jacobites were the perfect fit. Together Spain and the Jacobites quickly created an 
ambitious plan to invade Britain and restore James to the British throne. Necessary to the 
plan’s success was secrecy, speed, and a little luck.  
 
 
 Chapter Four. James Francis Edward Stuart, Alberoni, and Ormonde: The Planning of the 
1719 Jacobite Rebellion 
 As James Francis Edward Stuart made his way back to Rome from Spain in July 
1719, he may well have wondered how it all went wrong. A few months earlier in February 
1719, he had traveled the same path in reverse in expectation of leading an invasion of the 
British Isles from Spain in order to retake the crowns of his “natural home.” For James and 
Philip V, the European-wide War of the Quadruple Alliance, which was being fought at that 
time, presented an opportunity for them to retake what they both believed belonged to them. 
Their plan to raise a Jacobite Rebellion in England and Scotland was the first step. By 
reconstructing here below for the first time the events and stages of the 1719 rebellion, we 
can learn what each side expected to gain from helping the other, and recover the information 
needed to determine if it was truly a “Jacobite” rebellion.97 
War Begins 
Cardinal Giulio Alberoni’s appointment as prime minister of Spain in 1715 was an 
important step in a sequence of events leading to the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. Starting in 
1715, with Alberoni leading the country, Spain initiated a new aggressive policy aimed at 
monopolizing the maritime trade in the Mediterranean, a market that Spain had previously 
controlled during much of the 16
th 
and early part of the 17
th
 centuries. The Mediterranean 
trade was an important part of the Spanish economy, but controlling the seas in the 
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Mediterranean also meant the ability to reclaim lost territory from the Treaty of Rastaat. The 
biggest threat to Spanish power in the Mediterranean was Britain, and Spain took measures to 
decrease British influence. During the 1715 Jacobite rebellion Spain offered to supply the 
Jacobites and their allies with a small number of troops, but this plan fell through with the 
death of Louis XIVof France.  Even after these plans fell through because of the collapse of 
the rebellion, Spain continued to support James, providing him with a small yearly pension.
98
 
Closer to the Mediterranean and still an enemy of Spain from the War of Spanish Succession 
was the Austrian empire. The new aggressive policy of the Spanish Empire in the 
Mediterranean, directed especially towards the Austrian Empire, put both countries on edge. 
Because the relationship between them was so tense, it took only a minor dispute to 
precipitate war. In May 1717, the Austrians in Italy arrested Jose Molines, Grand Inquisitor 
of Spain, and refused to release him.
99
 Spain responded later that year by invading Sardinia, 
an Austrian territory that they had lost in the Treaty of Rastaat, quickly overtaking it.  
Following up this attack, in 1718, a Spanish army of 30,000 men went to Sicily, and it 
appeared to contemporaries as though Spanish glory was resurrecting itself.
100
 While Spain 
invaded Austria’s Italian possessions (which it had acquired from Spain during the War of 
Spanish Succession), the Austrian Empire was fighting the Turks and could ill-afford a war 
on two fronts. Therefore, Austria counted on its British allies to prevent Spain from invading 
Austrian possessions. 
In the summer of 1718, Britain sent Admiral George Byng and his fleet to the 
Mediterranean to observe Spain and report to Britain the status of the Italian Peninsula.
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Unfortunately, for Philip and Alberoni, Byng also carried orders to interfere if Spain attacked 
Austrian possessions now protected by an alliance with Britain. Byng presented Alberoni 
with Britain’s desire for peace in the Mediterranean. Britain wished Alberoni would 
withdraw his troops from Sicily so that the Mediterranean would return to peace. Spain 
refused these conditions and believed the British fleet was present merely to observe. 
Misjudging Byng’s orders, Spain and Alberoni went ahead with the aforementioned invasion 
of Sicily. They soon regretted the attack as Admiral Byng engaged the Spanish fleet on 
August 11, off the Sicilian coast at the Battle of Cape Passaro, resulting in a significant 
British victory. The Spanish fleet floundered back to Spain and Britain maintained naval 
dominance in the Mediterranean. Despite the attack, Britain and Spain were not yet at war. 
Britain remained hopeful that a peaceful solution still existed. Britain’s hopes were soon 
shattered in early October 1718, as Spain, in retaliation to Byng’s attack, seized all British 
merchant ships, merchant goods, and all British possessions in Spain.
102
 Tensions rose and in 
the months that followed Austria, Holland, and Britain declared war on Spain and by 
December 1718, the War of the Quadruple Alliance officially began. 
While the Spanish attacked the Austrians in Sardinia and Sicily and quickly gained 
strength, the Jacobites paid close attention to events in the Mediterranean. Spain’s defeat at 
the Battle of Cape Passaro in August 1718 provided an opportunity for the Jacobites to gain a 
potential ally against the British. The Jacobites had been planning potential invasions of 
Britain after the failure of the fifteen. James Butler, the Duke of Ormonde, James’s main 
foreign liaison, had been in Sweden in 1717 trying to convince Charles XII to join the 
Jacobites in an invasion of Britain. As we have seen above, Ormonde, an Irish lord, became a 
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supporter of the exiled Jacobite king. In 1715, Ormonde was himself exiled because of his 
support of James in the fifteen.
103
 After the fifteen, Ormonde was so notorious for scheming 
that wherever he ventured to, headlines soon followed in British newspapers claiming the 
country Ormonde resided in was preparing to help the Jacobites to invade Britain. Ormonde 
did not work alone, however, as John Erskine, the Earl of Mar was James’s primary 
collaborator. In April of 1718, Mar, who was monitoring the news passing through France, 
suggested to Alberoni, the Spanish Prime Minister, the idea of invading Britain, but Alberoni 
never responded.
104
 In December, Mar told Ormonde that Alberoni surely regretted turning 
down the Jacobites’ offer that April, and he believed that after Passaro Alberoni was eager to 
help the Jacobites especially with so much to gain in a successful invasion.
105
 If Spain could 
keep Britain out of the Mediterranean there was little to stop it from controlling the whole 
region.  
 Mar was right. Alberoni eagerly sought allies against Britain after the battle of Cape 
Passaro. He sent ministers to Russia and Sweden along with every country that had poor 
relations with England.
106
Alberoni sought a war and the Jacobites provided him with a 
seemingly ideal proposition. Ormonde wrote to both James and the Earl of Mar from Paris on 
October 3, 1718 informing them about the seizure of all British merchant possessions in 
Spain. He believed that the time was right for the Jacobites to approach Spain again. It is 
difficult to determine how many of the details of the plan were already drafted by Ormonde 
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when he arrived in Spain on December 1. Several times he mentioned a “count” or “lord” of 
Oxford supplying him with information from England, about the ports to land in and which 
areas would be most likely to support a Jacobite rebellion. This information inevitably led to 
the creation of some type of plan for invasion of Britain. The count of Oxford was most likely 
Robert Harley the Earl of Oxford, former Lord High Treasurer of Britain, who has been 
suspected of supporting the Jacobites. If Harley had supplied the information to Ormonde 
then the Jacobites had someone knowledgeable of the British government to help them, 
possibly shedding insight into weak areas of defense.
107
 
 Despite lack of clarity about who supplied Ormonde with information on English 
defenses, there is no doubt that, he had the outline of a plan in place, by mid-October 1718. It 
is not too difficult to believe that he and the Jacobites had a rough outline of the plan 
formulated since 1715 when Spain and France were supposed to send troops into England. In 
October 1718 he wrote to Mar and James informing them of the departure date (before the 
end of Hilary term, or before the end of March), and
 
believed the Jacobites needed to make 
overtures to Spain immediately.
108
 This suggests that Ormonde, James, and Mar already 
knew the basic elements of the invasion plan (where to land and how big of an army they 
needed); all Ormonde needed to do to initiate action, assemble an army, and set the departure 
date(s). He warned that if the Jacobites waited then the war might end and they would miss 
their chance. Haste was needed since they had not yet even “planned” the expedition into 
Britain. Ormonde wrote to James urging him to push Alberoni to start the planning. He feared 
that if Britain and Spain made peace then James would lose out.
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  In November, Spain and the Jacobites became more organized. Alberoni wrote to 
Ormonde inviting him to Spain to help design an expedition of Scottish, Spanish, and 
Swedish forces to depose George I of England. While Mar and James waited to hear the 
results of Ormonde’s visit with Alberoni, Ormonde was busy assembling his Jacobite forces 
and covering his tracks. By this time Spain had made it clear, they were not looking for a 
peaceful solution after seizing British possessions in Spain. Alberoni had been working hard 
to strengthen Spain’s position in the War of the Quadruple Alliance and knock out one of its 
larger opponents. Before Ormonde arrived, Alberoni participated in another clandestine 
operation, the Cellamare Conspiracy. The connections and relations between the nobility of 
France and Spain in the early eighteenth century could become problematic when it came 
time for succession. The Cellamare Conspiracy was a prime example of those connections 
and the problems they created. Philip V of Spain was Louis XV’s uncle. When Louis XIV 
died in 1715, Louis XV was too young to rule and Philip V was one of the closest relatives to 
the young dauphin king but Philip had surrendered his right to the French throne at the close 
of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714). Therefore, Philippe d’Orléans ruled 
France as regent in Louis XV’s place. Philip wished to get rid of Philippe and place himself 
as the regent of Louis XV, and by doing so strengthen his country with an alliance with 
France, and what better way to do so than by controlling both countries. Philip and Philippe 
did not have a good relationship after 1707 when the allies attempted to replace Philip V with 
Philippe d’Orlèans as king of Spain. The Cellamare conspiracy was designed by Alberoni and 
the Spanish ambassador to France, Antonio del Giudice the Prince of Cellamare, to remove 
Philippe and place Philip V as regent of young Louis XV. In early December 1718, French 
police discovered the plan, traced it back to the Spanish ambassador, and because of this, 
France declared war on Spain in January 1719.
110
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The Plan is Set 
Upon arriving in Spain on December 1, 1718, Ormonde wrote to Alberoni who was in 
Madrid. The two men exchanged a series of letters during the first two weeks of December. 
They wrote instead of meeting in person because they wanted to keep the invasion a secret 
and keep Ormonde away from Madrid (the most likely destination for Ormonde if he was 
scheming with Spain) to help keep up the ruse that Ormonde was only seeking asylum in 
Spain. If Britain were to become aware of the attack then it would have time to set up 
defenses, lessening the chance of success. Because Ormonde was so well known, he needed 
an inconspicuous reason to go to Spain. Therefore, he told everyone that he sought asylum in 
Spain because France no longer allowed James or his court to stay in France. This was 
believable because while the regent ruled France for the young dauphin king he took a less 
hospitable stance towards the Jacobites than Louis XIV had.
111
 Ormonde’s ruse appeared to 
deceive some in Europe, as even James was unaware that Ormonde was in Spain. James was 
baffled when he heard of it from Cardinal Aquaviva, but pretended he knew of it in order to 
seem in charge of his men. James was upset that Ormonde had traveled to Spain without 
letting him know. From James’s point of view the last time he had communicated with 
Ormonde they were still planning the expedition and nothing had been finalized. James 
almost scolds Ormonde in his next letter because he was the last person to know that 
Ormonde had left France for Spain. Despite his shock, James was glad Ormonde was there 
and warned him that Cardinal Alberoni could be stubborn so he had to make it appear as 
though the idea to invade Britain was Alberoni’s idea from the start.112  
Alberoni probably needed little convincing to invade Britain after the battle of Cape 
Passaro, as both he and Ormonde seemed eager to work together when Ormonde arrived in 
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Spain. The Jacobites most likely had a ‘generic’ version of the plan to invade Britain left over 
from their failed plans in 1715 and 1717. The new plan that involved Spain most likely 
followed this outline but needed to be modified to fit the current situation. The invasion plans 
evolved quickly, as circumstances changed daily during its creation. Ormonde believed that 
Sweden could be convinced to invade Britain if it was at peace with Norway.
113
 He was 
likely to have good knowledge of Swedish-Jacobite relations since he spent time the previous 
year there working on an alliance between the two. For the Jacobites, the planning of the 
expedition went better than expected. Alberoni agreed to do anything within reason to help 
the Jacobite cause. He was specifically interested in returning James to the British throne. 
Within one week, they had created the framework for the plan. Spain, the Jacobites, and 
possibly Sweden would send a force to Britain and together they would fight to restore 
James.
114
 
Planning went so well, that Ormonde sent out orders to his officers within one week 
of meeting Alberoni. On December 8, Ormonde wrote to George Keith, the Earl of 
Marischal, one of Ormonde’s top generals, asking him to travel to Spain. Keith and his 
brother James Keith served with the Jacobites during the fifteen. They had spent the last year 
in France waiting for another invasion and orders to mobilize. In August, George Keith’s 
Jacobite friends urged him to travel to Spain and offer his services to Alberoni for the 
invasion of Sicily. Keith was, however, reluctant to leave having fallen in love with life in 
France. Despite their love for French life, George and James Keith left for Spain in December 
upon receiving word from Ormonde.
115
 Ormonde stressed to George Keith the importance of 
keeping their reason for being in Spain a secret. He told them to avoid using their real names 
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and tell no one that they were there to speak to Ormonde. The Keiths’ discretion caused them 
significant delays upon their arrival in Spain.
116
 
After George and James Keith crossed the border in December, they were stuck in 
Catalonia for over a week because they followed Ormonde’s exact orders. A Spanish sentry 
asked them who they were and why they were in Spain. They provided fake names and told 
the sentry that Madrid was their destination. Because Spain and France were close to war, 
anyone who crossed the French-Spanish border was potentially a French spy. Without proper 
documentation, getting to Madrid was nearly impossible. Unsure of what to do with these two 
foreigners, the sentry took the Keiths deeper into Catalonia to see if the local governor knew 
what to do with them. At one of their stops, they received a warm welcome from a doctor to 
the Prince of Savoy. A rumor that James would soon arrive in Catalonia made the doctor 
mistake the Keiths for James and a member of his court. Despite the warm welcome, the 
Keiths still needed to speak to the local governor before they could travel to Madrid. After 
fifteen days of traveling, the Keiths eventually made it to Madrid, meeting up with Alberoni 
and Ormonde.
117
  
By December 17, Ormonde’s vision of the planed invasion was completed and Spain 
and the Jacobites were not to go it alone. Ormonde informed Alberoni that he sent one of his 
men, Sir Patrick Lawless, to Sweden to convince Charles XII, the Swedish king, to join them 
against their common enemy George I and the Hanoverians. Ormonde was convinced that 
Sweden would join because of their disdain for the Hanoverians and because Spain had 
agreed to finance part of Sweden’s expenses for the invasion of Britain, but only if Sweden 
sent the invasion out by the coming spring. According to Ormond’s plan, Sweden would send 
2,000 troops as well as additional arms and ammunition for another 5,000 men into northern 
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Britain, most likely Scotland. Spain would supply 8,000 men along with arms and 
ammunition for another 15,000 people to join the invasion in western England.
118
 The 
Jacobites would send a small expedition up to Scotland as a diversion drawing troops away 
from the main landing areas of Spain and Sweden before they arrived. This three-pronged 
attack was all supposed to be coordinated and put into action by the end of March (See figure 
4.1).
119
  
 
 
Alberoni agreed with the locations of Ormonde’s plan, but had some objections on 
how much support Spain would supply. Alberoni believed Sweden was eager and willing to 
help Spain and the Jacobites, and therefore, he had no problems in supporting them 
financially. He also agreed that a Scottish diversion would be extremely advantageous. 
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Sweden: 2,000 men, 5,000 
arms and ammunition 
Spain: 5,000 men, 
15,000 arms, 10 pieces 
artillery  
Jacobites: 300 men, 
2,000 arms  
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Ormonde told the Keiths to ask for 4,000 arms and 10,000 pistoles (Spanish currency). 
Alberoni was already facing the economic strain of the main invasion force and agreed to 
give them 2,000 arms, 5,000 pistoles and 6 companies of infantry (about 300 men) to help 
with the landing.
 120
 For the main invasion force, he wanted to send the 8,000 troops to 
England that Ormonde requested, but given Spain’s circumstances (the mass of their troops in 
Sicily and threat of invasion from France) he had to reduce the numbers to 5,000 men; 4,000 
infantry and 1,000 being cavalry on two months’ pay. Alberoni agreed, however, to supply 
the 15,000 arms Ormonde requested along with ten pieces of field artillery, a thousand barrels 
of powder, and all the necessary vehicles to transport and deploy these men. Alberoni’s final 
concern was the timing of the expedition. He too believed they had to sail before the end of 
March and told Ormonde that if James was not in Spain they would sail without him.
121
 His 
exact reason for this is unclear. It could have been because he was trying to beat poor weather 
or it could have easily been because he wanted to strike back at Britain quickly. Nevertheless, 
planners of the expedition wanted it departed by March. 
In addition to the major contribution of the Spanish in troops, arms, finances, and 
transport, there were four essential parts to the planed invasion: speed, secrecy, Swedish help, 
and support of Jacobites in Britain. To help make the Scottish clans more eager to join the 
Jacobites Ormonde had already sent for the Keiths to command the expedition in Scotland 
hoping their name would ignite support in Scotland. Given the recent failure of the fifteen, it 
was important for the Jacobite commander to be someone the Scottish people knew and 
trusted, and the Keiths seemed to be a logical choice. Ormonde also sent an additional 
Jacobite representative to Sweden to help speed up Sweden’s decision. Speed was important, 
but assembling a force in such a short span would not be very taxing on Spain since it was 
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already in a state of war and although Britain had declared war, it had not yet raised extra 
funds or troops to support a war (Britain would not do so until March).
122
 The Jacobites had 
scheduled the expedition to leave before the end of what Ormonde called the Hilary term (or 
by the end of March) and with Spain’s help could have an expedition outfitted in time. The 
most important factor was also the one that most difficult to control, secrecy.  
Ormonde became paranoid about spies and double agents. He had a few good reasons 
to be paranoid too. In 1715, the British government caught wind of the rebellion in western 
England before it got underway. Ormonde was also knowledgeable of the skill the British 
government possessed in espionage having spent time with parliament and seeing firsthand 
the information that spies had picked up put into action on the battlefield. To prevent 
information from slipping to the British government the first step the Jacobites used to 
combat this was writing in a secret code. To pass information to one another they had to send 
it through the mail. It was hard telling how many hands a letter passed through and whether 
or not those hands were loyal to the Jacobites or not. So a code was implemented to throw off 
any would -be spies. Take for instance Ormonde’s letter to Arthur Dillon (a Jacobite living in 
France) from December 9, 1718.  
“I have just received your obliging letter of the 29th [November] find you have seen 
or are to see one of Kemp's friends that to come lately from him. I hope and have 
great reasons to that Mrs. Ker and Mr. Gregory will be marryed but I there is no need 
of acquainting Mrs. Phillis of it yet if she knows it, it will not be a secret. Frank will 
certainly inform his friends of it which may make it publick and the match I do not 
acquaint her with some things relate to Mr. Ker and Evans they are for her Good my 
aunt Amorsley desires me not to be too hasty in informing my niece of it. I wrote to 
you last night and am still of same opinion as to Mrs. Digby. I am faithfully your's. I 
expect Mrs. Kemp's friend.” 123 
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At first glance, this letter although suspicious does not reveal any information about the 
invasion. This letter was just an account of two old friends catching up on gossip, discussing 
weddings, and writing about old friends. Fortunately for us today, the Jacobites wrote in the 
code in their letters and they are now located at Windsor Palace. After making the 
substitutions, the letter has an entirely new meaning. For instance, substitute Alberoni for 
Amorsley, England for Evans, the Earl of Mar for Frank, the King of Sweden for Kemp and 
Mr. Gregory, Spain for Mrs. Ker, James for Mrs. Phillis, and Arthur Dillon for Digby. Now 
the letter reveals that Spain and Sweden will form an alliance and not to tell James or Mar of 
the invasion because if they were to know, then the world would know.  
 Ormonde believed that Rome was a terrible place for James to reside while trying to 
plan a clandestine invasion of Britain. He told James that he was not safe there and had to 
leave without informing anyone of his true destination. He believed that spies surrounded 
James in Rome and he could not trust anyone, not even the clergy.
124
 Ormonde’s paranoia 
had merit. After all, James first learned about Ormonde’s arrival in Spain from Cardinal 
Aquaviva. On December 28, Ormonde wrote to James informing him that Rome was unsafe 
and he had to leave for Spain immediately. Most importantly, he was not to tell anyone where 
he was going and to disguise himself so no one knew he left.
125
 James followed Ormonde’s 
request closely and before he left he wrote to Pope Clement XI to apologize for leaving so 
suddenly and unannounced. He regretted that he could not tell the pope where he was headed 
and wished the pope would keep in touch with his jailed fiancée Maria Clementia (Austria 
with the insistence of her ally Britain had Clementia put in jail to prevent her marriage to 
James).
126
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 James, the earl of Mar, and the duke of Perth devised an elaborate plan to get James 
out of Rome. There was no good way to get James to Spain. If he traveled by land he had to 
go through Austrian and French territories, and he was an unwelcomed guest in both 
countries, but if they traveled by boat they risked running into the British fleet. The Jacobites 
chose to travel by both land and sea. On February 8 (NS), they prepared a carriage for James 
to travel north to Bologna in a ruse where he attempted to rescue his fiancée Princess Maria 
Clementia. Early in the morning of February 8, James snuck away to a Genoese boat and the 
earl of Mar and the duke of Perth traveled in the carriage to Bologna. Mar and Perth were 
soon followed by a courier who reported their movements to the authorities in Milan. The 
first night they stopped in Bologna and told several people that they were going after Princess 
Maria Clementia. They made their way north until February 17 (NS) when they were arrested 
outside Tortona, Italy. After their arrest, an Austrian general questioned them, but he was 
unable to ascertain their real identities, so he sent Mar and Perth to Milan. While in Milan, 
the duke of Perth was mistaken for James Francis Edward Stuart and because of this Mar and 
Perth were then kept in Milan bouncing from jail to jail until the Milan governor finally 
realized that James was not with them.
127
 The plan succeeded, however, as papers throughout 
Europe believed the Austrians had James sitting in jail in Milan. Headlines in Britain 
applauded the Austrians for their good work.
128
 The ruse worked and bought James time at 
sea.
 
While Mar and Perth sat in jail, James sailed to Spain dodging the British fleet. After his 
initial success in escaping Rome unnoticed, his luck soon ran out. The weather started to 
work against him and he did not make it to Spain until March 9 (NS).
129
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Although Alberoni and Ormonde attempted to keep the invasion a secret, Britain still 
knew it was coming. Britain was suspicious from the very beginning. On October 18 (29), 
1718, John Dalrymple, earl of Stair and British ambassador to France believed that Ormonde 
was going to Spain because Stair heard that Alberoni had requested Ormonde to visit him in 
Spain. Stair suspected that Alberoni was seeking an alliance with Spain because Ormonde 
had visited every other country that had poor relations with Britain.
130
 In January, Britain 
knew Ormonde was planning something and put out an arrest warrant for him in Ireland. The 
Irish had close connections to the Jacobites. Many had supported James II in the “Glorious” 
Revolution and others fought against Britain in the War of Spanish Succession. The British 
wanted Ormonde for treason, dead or alive, and the reward was 10,000 pounds. The warrant 
showed the knowledge Britain had of the plan stating that he went to Madrid in an attempt to 
gain Spanish support to insight a rebellion.
131
 Although Britain had the wrong location they 
were right about Ormonde, but this was also the speculation that went through the 
newspapers every time Ormonde went to a new country, but Britain had more than just 
speculation, they had reliable sources informing them of the moves of the Jacobites. 
One such source was French Statesman abbé Dubois who kept Britain well informed 
of Jacobite movements in Spain. On January 16, Dubois wrote to British Secretary of State 
James Craggs informing him of Ormonde’s intent in Spain. Dubois believed that Ormonde 
planned to use 6,000 men along with 15,000 rifles departing from Bilbao, Spain.
132
 For a 
clandestine operation, Dubois knew a great deal of information just four weeks after the 
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creation of the plan. Although Dubois had the wrong the location for the invasion landing, he 
was stunningly accurate on the amount of men, arms, and departure points for the invasion 
force. Even worse for the Jacobites was that they remained ignorant that the British knew 
much of their plans. Ormonde wrote to Alberoni on February 26 that it was a miracle no one 
knew of the invasion or where James had gone.
133
 British intelligence played a major role in 
the discovery of the invasion, and although it lacked several important details, by March 
1719, Britain was well aware of the Jacobite invasion plans. 
January–February 1719 
Important to the success of the operation was the arming and assembling of the 
English Jacobites. The 15,000 arms and 1,000 barrels of gunpowder were meant for these 
potential “Jacobite” soldiers, and arming these potential soldiers was key to the success of the 
rebellion. In January, Ormonde started to inform some of the Jacobites in Britain and France 
(Stamfort/Ezekiel Hamilton, Alexander Gordon, and Brigadier Campbell) that they were 
coming and to plan accordingly.
134
 He believed that at the rate the men were being assembled 
the ships would be ready to sail by the end of January and no later than February. He 
informed Alberoni that support for the Jacobites in Britain was strong and they would not 
lack men upon landing in England.
135
 The encouraging news from Ormonde sat well with 
Alberoni and their plans appeared to be coming together, but by the end of January, the 
invasion suffered serious setbacks.  
 On January 25 1719, Ormonde’s plans slowly began unraveling. First, they found out 
that Charles XII, King of Sweden, had died in battle. It was unclear who would take his place 
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and if the new king supported the invasion or not. Sweden’s participation was a key part of 
the invasion plans as a support to the Jacobites in Scotland, whose rebellion, a diversion, 
would clear the way for the main force landing in western England with little opposition. 
Also in January, France had declared war on Spain and was planning to invade it. Spain 
began defense preparations, which worried Ormonde. As all the setbacks started to mount up 
Ormonde began to question whether Spain was still committed to the invasion. Feeding his 
doubts was the slow progress of the Spanish fleet in Cadiz. He thought the ships were going 
to be ready to sail by the end of January but by the 25
 
(NS), they had yet to sail. The 
expedition also lacked 5 pieces of field artillery, 3,000 arms, and part of the money to pay the 
troops while they were in England.
136
 After the shock of losing Charles XII and the slow 
assembling of the Cadiz fleet set in, Ormonde regrouped and began modifying the invasion 
plans.  
Despite the setbacks, Ormonde still believed the invasion could succeed. The loss of 
the king of Sweden was unfortunate, but they had to plan as though Sweden was not going to 
help. If Sweden’s new ruler decided to support the invasion, the extra forces would help but 
Ormonde prepared to go on without them. Ormonde even believed that James Stanhope, the 
chief minister of Britain was willing to help the Jacobites consolidate power once they had 
gotten rid of George I. As far-fetched as this seems in retrospect there was some logic behind 
it. During the war of Spanish Succession, Stanhope was a prisoner and befriended Alberoni 
while Alberoni served under Vend me. Ormonde believed that the friendship between 
Alberoni and Stanhope could be used to the Jacobites’ advantage.137 Although Ormonde 
believed that Stanhope would help, there is no independent evidence to support this. 
Ormonde reached out to anyone he could in France and Holland trying to regroup and obtain 
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the necessary supplies that were lost from Sweden’s exit from the invasion plans.138 By 
February, Ormonde and Alberoni had regrouped and the invasion was once again under way.  
Ormonde set out for Coruña, Spain, on the north-west corner of the Iberian Peninsula 
believing that the fleet was to sail from Cadiz on February 10 and would later stop in Corun a 
to resupply and then depart for England.  Ormonde traveled by land across Spain and was 
hopeful he would meet up with James and any other extra men or supplies they found along 
the way.
139
 While traveling to Coruña, Ormonde provided some of the first details of the 
changed invasion plans. He sent letters to Jacobites in France and Holland (Arthur Dillon and 
Guillaume de Melun, Marquis de Risbourg along with other unnamed sources) asking them 
to purchase guns and supplies and ship them to Britain upon the arrival of the diversionary 
fleet in Scotland.
140
 He believed that while the diversionary fleet attacked the British in 
Scotland these men from France and Holland could sneak across the channel. He counted on 
an additional 2-3,000 arms and ammunition from Jacobite followers in France and Holland, 
thus making up for the lost supplies from Sweden (see figure 4.2). By the time the 
diversionary force would have arrived in Scotland, Ormonde believed that estimated number 
of arms and ammunition had grown to 5-6,000.
141
 On February 13, Ormonde wrote to the 
Duke of Gordon (who had participated in the fifteen) and told him that the invasion attempt 
was headed for England.
142
 This is the first time he wrote to anyone, outside of Alberoni, to 
tell where the expedition was headed. He also sent out orders with James Keith for the 
diversionary expedition to Scotland. By the end of February, however, their situation turned 
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bleak as the weather delayed the fleet because it was too foggy to sail and threw yet another 
wrench in the invasion plans. 
 
March 
March was a terrible month for the Jacobites. First, on March 15(4), a large English 
fleet consisting of four men of war and a host of merchant ships sailed near Portugal. 
Ormonde feared that if they docked in Lisbon, Britain would gain knowledge of the fleet in 
Cadiz and figure out its destination once they heard that the ships had left Cadiz.
143
 
Ormonde’s concerns were justified because Britain was well aware that the invasion was 
near. British agents from Lisbon sent word that Ormonde was meeting up with the Cadiz 
fleet, containing 4,000 men and 900 horses.
144
 On March 3 (11) 1719, British Secretary of 
State James Craggs knew something was imminent because Spain seized and captured about 
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40 French ships near Cadiz and told them that Spain was using them to transport Spanish 
supplies.
145
 By March 8 (February 28), Britain obtained even more details. Abbé Dubois 
wrote Craggs an even more detailed account of the impending invasion stating that he had a 
source that told him the invasion would land in six weeks, with Spain landing near Bristol in 
south-western England. This is the first time that the exact landing spot for the invasion was 
mentioned. Ormonde had not mentioned it, nor does he in any of his letters. The source said 
the Jacobites had Irishmen with them and they would unite with the people of the region, 
claiming that the lesser nobility and as much as two-thirds of the population of the city of 
Bristol would support the Jacobites.
146
 Dubois wrote that Spain had assembled a fleet in 
Cadiz and the Jacobites sent a man Ormonde trusted into Holland to buy supplies to send 
over to Britain. The source had also informed him about Sweden’s potential involvement and 
even with the death of Charles XII, the invasion was still progressing. Dubois also believed 
that Sweden was no threat, and that Britain had a better chance of an alliance with Sweden 
after Charles XII’s death than the Jacobites did.147 Finally, this source told Dubois that there 
was going to be a diversionary attempt in Scotland. Dubois believed the source was reliable 
(which by this account as it compared to the expedition, it was) and offered him 2,000 
pistoles if what he said was true. Dubois then upped the offer; if he captured Ormonde and 
brought him to France, he would get a pension from the kings of France and Britain.
148  
This report in fact, seems very reliable. The only detail that the source got wrong was 
the Irishmen in the army. Spain sent no Irishmen (or at least not an Irish regiment, which they 
had) to England (besides Ormonde). This was an important detail because as long as Britain 
believed there were Irish regiments joining the invasion they felt they had to keep Ireland 
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defended as well. Despite this, the rest of the information the source had was very specific 
and at least partially correct, including Sweden’s changing role in the invasion, Bristol as the 
invasion’s location, they knew that Ormonde had sent for supplies in Holland, and that the 
invasion was landing in six weeks. Most of these details were relatively new to the invasion, 
and had occurred since the end of January. Having Bristol as the invasion spot makes sense 
because the Jacobites had wanted this port during the fifteen, and it was one of the biggest 
ports in western England. If the information about Lord Oxford is true then it would make 
sense that the plan for the 1719 invasion would be based upon the plans of the previous 
invasion. In addition, Bristol is located close to Bath, which was another city believed to be 
largely Jacobite, and had held a stockpile of Jacobite weapons during the fifteen. Despite how 
reliable this report seems it is also possible to have found most of this information by reading 
a British paper and being astute in politics. It was no secret that Ormonde was in Spain and 
that this led to speculation of an invasion of Britain by Spain. If one had paid attention during 
the fifteen then they could see the value in landing at Bristol. The death of the King of 
Sweden had been in British newspapers and a new regime most likely meant a change in 
tactics. Nevertheless, the information about Ormonde’s dealings in Holland and the timing of 
the invasion seem to be well informed. It is because of these two facts that it appears that the 
Jacobites had severe internal breeches and that their plans had been compromised by that 
point. The only question remains is who told the British? Dubois’s source appears to have 
been close to the plans of the invasion. It is likely that they were one of the people Ormonde 
wrote to in February to ask for more help once Sweden was out of the Jacobite plans.
149
  
As news of the impending invasion spread in Britain, Ormonde and Alberoni became 
aware that their secret was out. On March 17 (NS), Ormonde, James, and Alberoni learned 
from Spanish sources that France and England knew something was amiss and were 
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assembling a fleet to meet the Spanish in the Channel.
150
 On March 22 (NS), the news grew 
worse. After all the trouble they went through to keep it a secret, France and Britain figured 
out that James was in Spain. By now, it was nearly impossible to deny that Spain was up to 
something.
151
 This appeared to be the breaking point for Ormonde. He told Alberoni that 
when he first planned the invasion he only needed 5,000 men because it was a surprise. Now 
that England knew about the plan, Ormonde feared that they could no longer count on Britain 
weakening their forces in England by sending men to Ireland. If Britain did not move part of 
its army to Ireland, it would have more men to defend against the Jacobites in England and 
Scotland. He made it clear; he thought he could still land in England, but it would be difficult 
since the British would be hot on their trail and presumably in greater force. The original plan 
as Ormonde had drawn it up could no longer succeed. While Ormonde waited on the arrival 
of the Spanish fleet from Cadiz, he suggested a change of plans focusing on an invasion of 
Scotland alone.
152
 He believed that Scotland was less well defended, which would give them 
more time to organize upon landing. He warned Alberoni that if he did not hear from him 
before the Cadiz fleet arrived he would attempt a landing in England, but if it proved too 
difficult, he was going to Scotland.
153
 
A Failure to Communicate 
While Ormonde and Alberoni were busy figuring out what to do, James and George 
Keith were carrying out their part of the expedition. Before George Keith left for San 
Sebastian, Spain, Ormonde went over with him the plans for the diversionary force. George 
Keith would sail out of Spain and meet up with his brother James in Scotland. From there 
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George Keith would lead an expedition and they would create as much of a diversion as they 
could until Ormonde arrived. Keith believed the 300 men that Spain supplied would turn into 
thousands once rumors spread about them.
154
 The Spanish soldiers would help inspire the 
Jacobites in Scotland to raise in arms against George I. The number of men Britain would 
have to send up north would clear the way for the main force landing in western England.
155
 
While George Keith assembled the diversionary expedition in Spain, James Keith arranged 
Jacobite support in France.    
Alberoni had sent James Keith to inform the Jacobites in France of the impending 
invasion. He carried with him a phrase from Ormonde, “pray have entire confidence in the 
bearer” along with 18,000 crowns.156 He departed on February 19 (NS) stopping in San 
Sebastian, Spain where he delivered 12,000 crowns and the supplies for the Scottish invasion 
to Prince Campo Florido.
157
 Once in France he gave the remaining 6,000 crows to the 
Jacobite forces in Bordeaux and met up with William Murray the Marquis de Tullibardine in 
Orleans on March 3 (NS). Tullibardine had served with the Jacobites during the fifteen. In 
Orleans, Keith tried to gain support from another Jacobite Campbell Glenderuel, but he told 
Keith that he would only take orders from the Earl of Mar.
158
 This early conflict in the chain 
of command was a sign of the problems to come during the expedition in Scotland. After 
Glenderuel refused to support them, Keith and Tullibardine went to Richard Berry, an Irish 
merchant who fitted out the expedition.
159
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After being fully equipped, James Keith, Tullibardine, and several other Jacobites 
departed from France on March 19 (NS) eleven days after George Keith had departed from 
Spain (March 8 NS). Their fleet consisting of three frigates and five transports sailed between 
Dover and Calais and then around the Orkneys to the Isle of Lewis, the rendezvous point with 
the troops arriving from Spain.
160
 After departure, they experienced bad weather at sea, which 
pushed them off course. On the night of March 26, near the Isle of Lewis, they came across a 
fleet that had the same number of ships as George Keith and the Jacobite fleet, but they 
decided to sail past them and wait until morning to speak with them.
161
 As it turned out, they 
narrowly escaped disaster. What they saw was actually a British transport fleet carrying men 
and supplies to Ireland in anticipation of the Jacobite rebellion. On April 4 (NS), they arrived 
at the Isle of Lewis but saw no sign of the Jacobite fleet. James Keith set out to find his 
brother and walked across the island where he found his brother George and the rest of the 
Jacobites.
162
  
Before James Keith went back across the island to get Tullibardine and the Jacobites 
who traveled with him from France, he warned George about the dissension over who would 
lead the expedition. George believed that there was little to worry about because the papers 
he received from Ormonde stated that he was in charge, but if anyone outranked him, he 
would be glad to step aside as long as it helped complete the task.
163
 George was not alone in 
his belief; Mar too believed that George Keith was in charge of the expedition because 
Ormonde’s orders put him in charge. Tullibardine, however, believed he was leading the 
expedition. In 1717, James had selected Tullibardine to take charge of his troops in Scotland 
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during a planned invasion by Sweden. Therefore, when James Keith arrived in France in 
February 1719 Tullibardine still thought that he was in charge of James’s troops in Scotland. 
This conflict led to constant quarreling and indecisiveness during the Scottish expedition.
164
 
The next day Tullibardine met up with the Keith brothers and they decided that 
Tullibardine was in charge because he was the most experienced general among them, but 
despite choosing a “leader” tensions remained. Their first task as a unit was choosing where 
to attack. Tullibardine wanted to wait on the Isle of Lewis until word from Ormonde arrived, 
but no one else agreed, so Tullibardine begrudgingly agreed to follow the plan that Ormonde 
and Alberoni drew up to go to the mainland and take Inverness. The Jacobites assumed that 
the British only had 300 men defending Inverness, who were in no shape to fight. Once they 
took Inverness, they would wait there until they gathered enough support from local Jacobites 
to march south and attack.
165
 This plan soon stalled as Tullibardine pulled out his old 
commission from James stating that he was in charge and told the Keiths he wished to stay on 
the Isle of Lewis. George Keith and the others reluctantly agreed to Tullibardine’s plan to 
stay on the Isle of Lewis until Ormonde reached England.
166
 
Britain prepares for war: The King’s Speech 
While the Scottish invasion waited on Ormonde, he was in turn waiting on the fleet 
from Cadiz. Foggy conditions had delayed the Spanish Armada from sailing until March 7 
(NS). Back in Britain, reports came in daily, which presented a clearer picture of the details 
of the planned invasion. Craggs’s letters to Dubois and Stair show how opinion changed of 
the expedition as it came closer to invading. On February 28, (March 11 NS) Stair thought an 
invasion was ridiculous and had no chance of succeeding, but he took the necessary 
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precautions just to be safe. He vented his frustration with the Jacobites to Craggs, “It is a 
ridiculous thing for us always to be in a precarious situation as to be at the mercy of a prince 
that will send 4,000 or 5,000 men into England.”167 As Britons received more information 
about the invasion, they began to worry. 
Between February 28 (March 11) and March 15 (26 NS), the situation in Britain 
changed drastically. On March 7 (18 NS) Britain assembled its infantry and called for 
privateers offering payment for sinking any Spanish ships.
168
 Within days they received 
enough privateers to make a small fleet and on March 9 (20 NS). Britain sent four battalions 
and eighteen squadrons to the west coast of England as lookouts.
 169 
King George I addressed 
parliament on March 10 (21) warning Britain of the impending Jacobite attack, denounced 
James Francis Edward Stuart, and asked parliament to allot him money to pay for the defense 
of Britain.
170
 To help raise the necessary funds to support the war, the Bank of England 
issued bonds, payable within four months’ time.171 George I called for more sailors, initiating 
press gangs, and as another precaution, he reissued the arrest warrant for Ormonde.
172
 By 
March 15 (26), Craggs was in a panic and told Stair to muster any able-bodied man he could 
find in addition to the infantry called up on the 7
th
 to defend against Spain immediately.
173
 
Clearly, he felt this was a serious invasion and not an idle threat. By the end of March, 
Britain was ready for a war. 
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Most of the precautions Britain took to prepare for war were never put to use, as the 
main Spanish Armada never arrived. After leaving Cadiz on March 7 (NS), the Spanish fleet 
sailed southwest and then turned north until they were located seventy leagues west of Cape 
Finisterre, in northwest Spain, just outside the rendezvous point with Ormonde.  They took 
this rather unorthodox route to avoid the British fleet that was anchored in Lisbon, and to 
keep up the ruse that they were actually sailing to the West Indies and not Britain. Early in 
the morning of March 27 (NS), the crew of the Spanish fleet awoke to a large storm. For two 
days, they battled against the winds, waves, and rain. The storm left the fleet scattered across 
the Atlantic, too spread out to regroup. Many of the ships sustained damaged; others ran low 
on supplies and threw their horses overboard because they had no water to give them. The 
situation for many was bleak and during the next few weeks, the ships of the fleet staggered 
back into the closest port they could find.
174
 
Around April 6 (NS), the first reports of possible damage to the fleet reached Lisbon, 
and over the next few weeks, the fleet slowly returned to ports scattered along the Iberian 
coast, including Lisbon and far to the south Cadiz among others.
175
 For the next few weeks, 
news of the disaster reached Madrid, and by late April Alberoni and Ormonde finally 
gathered enough information to determine that the Spanish Armada had sustained too much 
damage to sail to Britain. There was little time to reflect on this, because the diversionary 
fleet was still awaiting Ormonde in Scotland. Ormonde was optimistic that they could 
regroup and sail out in a matter of weeks and he, Philip V, and Alberoni tried desperately to 
send two vessels to aid George Keith in Scotland.  Ormonde managed to gather some men 
and supplies that were ready to depart but Alberoni called them back at the last minute 
because of changing circumstances. In fact, Alberoni had another problem to deal with; Spain 
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had been invaded by France and sustained heavy damage in many of its ports, further 
depleting Spain’s already low naval resources and Alberoni put the expedition on hold until 
at least August.
176
 
The War comes to Spain 
During the time that Spain waited to hear news of the Armada, the war developed into 
a European conflict. A French fleet attacked Spanish ports in late April and France sent an 
army under the command of the duke of Berwick to invade Spain. Berwick was the 
illegitimate son of James II. He had made a name for himself serving France as a general 
during the War of Spanish Succession. He was one of the best generals of his time and would 
have made a significant contribution to the Jacobites had he not be loyal to France first and 
the Stuarts second. His loyalty to France put Berwick in an awkward position. At the same 
time (April 1719) that he was communicating or at least receiving communications from the 
Jacobites about possible invasion attempts, he was also communicating with the British 
government including Stair and Craggs. Thus Berwick knew what both sides were doing, but 
was on the side of France. In April, Berwick and the French army took several towns along 
the border and then headed west to attack Spanish shipyards in the Basque Country. The 
destruction of these shipyards and the supplies in conjunction with the destruction of the 
Spanish Armada at sea, dealt a crippling blow to the Spanish Navy.
177
 The attack of the 
Spanish shipyards had actually been planned back in January between Stair and the duc d’ 
Orleans, but had been delayed.
178
 The timing could not have been worse for Spain. 
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With the outbreak of hostilities on Spanish soil, Alberoni knew that Spain could not 
spare any ships, so the Jacobite invasion had to be postponed. For Spain, delaying the fleet 
was the smartest decision but to Ormonde it must have been painful news. On May 9 (April 
30) Ormonde performed the difficult but inevitable duty of informing George Keith and the 
Jacobites in Scotland that they were alone. Ormonde, unhappy with the situation, wrote his 
frustrations to his friend and Jacobite supporter Prince Campo Florido. He blamed the 
weather saying “la facheuse accident arrivé a la flotte, ce qui est un terrible contre-temps 
mais il faut se soumettre avec patience a la volonté de Dieu et attendre une occasion 
favourable”, but he realized that was little comfort for those in Scotland.179  
While Tullibardine waited to hear from Ormonde, the rest of the expedition grew 
restless and took matters into their own hands. Forcing Tullibardine against his will to agree, 
they loaded up the ships and sailed away from the Isle of Lewis, towards the Scottish 
mainland on April 8 (April 19 NS). Once ashore George Keith wanted to take the Spanish 
troops and 500 local Jacobites and seize Inverness as planned. Tullibardine unsurprisingly 
disagreed and claimed that the locals would not help them until Ormonde landed. 
Tullibardine believed that the highlanders were still too distraught from the failure of the 
fifteen and would not support the Jacobites until they believed the uprising would succeed.
180 
By this point they had resolved the problem of command by dividing it: Keith controlled the 
Spanish
 
because of his favor with Ormonde and Tullibardine controlled the Jacobites because 
of his higher standing among the Jacobites.
  
On April 28 (May 9 NS), they set up defenses at 
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Eilean Donan Castle and waited for news of Ormonde’s landing.181A few days after setting 
up defense at Eilean Donan Castle, Tullibardine suggested they sail back to Spain but George 
Keith effectively changed Tullibardine’s mind by threatening to burn the Spanish ships rather 
than retreating and on May 2 (May 13 NS) sent their ships back to Spain empty instead.
 182
  
  Eilean Donan Castle was an old Scottish fortress belonging to the local clans. It sat 
on an island between three lochs: Loch Duich, Loch Alsh, and Loch Long (See figure 4.3). 
The castle’s fortified walls and natural defensive setting made it a perfect spot to holdout 
against the British army, until they heard word from Ormonde (See figure 4.4). The Jacobites 
put a small garrison of forty five Spaniards and a few Scotts in the castle and the rest of the 
men hid the surplus arms and ammunition in barns on the mainland within two miles of the 
castle. While awaiting Ormonde’s arrival, on May 4 (15), they received word of the 
destruction of Ormonde’s fleet. Mr. Wallace, a Jacobite agent from Edinburgh, told them that 
Ormonde’s fleet was destroyed and to continue the rebellion with only 300 men was ill 
advised.
183
 In addition to this bad news, by that time Britain began assembling an army to put 
down the rebellion in Scotland.
184
 Tullibardine and George Keith agreed to continue 
searching for men and supplies to see if a rebellion without Ormonde could still succeed.
185
 
So they and the rest of their followers (except the 45 men garrison at the castle) went further 
inland recruiting volunteers and gathering supplies. They returned May 9 (20 NS) to find 
British ships out front of Eilean Donan Castle. The Royal Navy had sent five ships into 
Loach Ash: the Worcester, Assistance, Dartmouth, Enterprise, and Flamborough.
186
 On the 
morning of the 10 (21 NS), while Tullibardine, George Keith, and the rest of the Jacobites 
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scrambled to move the rest of their supplies, Royal Navy Captain Boyle sent a flag of truce to 
the castle, (which, by this time, had only a small garrison of Spanish soldiers) hoping the 
Jacobites would surrender. He received a cold response, as Spanish riflemen fired upon the 
men carrying the truce. Finding his foe unwilling to surrender, Boyle, and three ships of the 
Royal Navy opened fire on the castle. A Spanish soldier snuck out of the castle and told 
Boyle that the garrison was willing to surrender. A British landing party came ashore that 
night with the tide, overtook the castle, and destroyed nearby Jacobite ammunition stores.
187 
 
Battle of Glenshiel 
After they lost Elian Donan Castle, the Jacobites knew they were in a losing situation 
but it was at this moment that hope arrived. On May 15 (26 NS) Jacobite recruits and more 
supplies began meeting up with Tullibardine, George Keith and the remainder of the initial 
Jacobite forces and this brought new life to the rebellion.
188 
In addition to this the Jacobites 
still believed that Ormonde would soon arrive after they received a letter on May 23 (June 3 
NS) from Jacobite agents in Edinburgh dated from May 11 (22) that Ormonde’s fleet had 
been repaired and was on its way.
189
 Outnumbered, the Jacobites dug in and prepared for a 
defensive fight until the main force could arrive. On June 10 (21), the British infantry slowed 
by their long march north finally caught up with the Jacobites at Glenshiel. The Jacobites 
were in an advantageous position at Glenshiel, whose steep hills, and rocky terrain provided 
as natural defenses on all sides including the Jacobite flanks.
190
 Therefore, the British had to 
array their troops in the valley below and the battle would commence there (see figure 4.5). 
Adding to the Jacobite advantage were their numbers. Some of the local clans came out in 
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support including the famous (or infamous) Rob Roy McGregor. Altogether, the Jacobites 
outnumbered the British by about five hundred men. Tullibardine put two hundred men on 
both flanks and his strongest force (close to a thousand-strong including himself and the 
remaining Spanish soldiers) at the center of the Jacobite lines. He expected the British to 
attack the center because his flanks were well protected; much of his strategy focused on 
reinforcing his center during the attack.  
The British army took a slightly different approach and deployed the bulk of their 
attacking forces against both Jacobite flanks.
191
 The British also used a few pieces of field 
artillery, which defended their position from attack despite their small numbers. Early on in 
the battle Lord George Murray and the Jacobite right flank came under heavy fire and quickly 
retreated, the left flank soon followed. The center of the Jacobite line consisting of Spaniards, 
fought bravely, but they too fell back, up to the top of a mountain, which stopped the enemy’s 
pursuit. By then night had fallen but Don Nicolas Bolanco commander of the Spanish troops 
of Galicia offered to make a counter attack at first light.
192
 Tullibardine believed it was 
useless to attack anymore because if the world saw how few Jacobites there were they would 
think the Jacobites were weak. Their only options were to move to the highlands and skirmish 
until James arrived (in June the Jacobites in Scotland still believed that the Spanish fleet 
could regroup) or delay the British long enough to destroy the ammunition stores they had 
left and then vanish. The beleaguered Jacobite army, low on supplies and hope, decided to go 
home. On the morning on June 11 (22) the remaining Spanish soldiers surrendered, Rob Roy 
McGregor blew up the remaining ammunition, and the Jacobites disappeared into the 
highlands.
193
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Figure 4.3 View of the three lochs from Eilean Donan Castle. To the right is Loch 
Long, straight ahead and veering to the left is Loch Alsh, and to the left out of 
picture is Loch Duich. 
Figure 4.4 Eilean Donan Castle as it appears today, reconstructed. 
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Figure 4.5 Map of the Battle of Glenshiel. From Dickson’s The Jacobite Attempt of 1719. 
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After the battle, the Keiths waited, escaped Scotland, and headed for Spain traveling 
by land, but they were incarcerated along the way in France.
194
 The Spanish troops who 
fought so bravely at Glenshiel sat in an Edinburgh prison and awaited a prisoner exchange 
(which did not occur until September). By July, the hope of reassembling the fleet was all but 
gone. Philip and Alberoni were busy dealing with the French and British invasion of Spain 
and their resources were stretched thin. James returned to Rome and with him left what little 
chance the expedition had of ever reassembling. He did not blame anyone for the failed 
invasion and believed certain things were out of their control.
195
 As early as May, even before 
the defeat of the expeditionary force, the failure of the whole plan was clear. The Earl of Mar, 
who had grown tired of the climate in Italy and the failures of the Jacobites, asked George I 
and the French regent for a pardon.
196
 He wrote to Stair in May 1719 telling him he was done 
with James and the Jacobite cause.
197
 Ormonde too felt no desire to join James in Rome. He 
still hoped that that Spain could in future supply an expeditionary fleet, but even he 
recognized that for the present season the battle had been lost.
198
 He wrote to a friend on Aug 
23 (NS) that peace between Spain and Britain was inevitable before the upcoming spring and 
Alberoni must be abashed by the prospect.
199
 Ormonde was quick to see that, once peace 
occurred, Spain would rid itself of Alberoni. In December 1719, Philip did just that, he 
kicked Alberoni out of the country and started peace talks with Britain and her allies. 
The planning of the rebellion was clearly a joint venture. After considerable delays 
and despite having lost the edge of total surprise, both sides sent out their men and ships by 
early March. Because of the storm, only the Jacobites in fact made it to Britain, the Spanish 
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fleet was scattered and suffered severe damage. Coupled with the near simultaneous invasion 
of Spain by the French, Alberoni decided to postpone the invasion, leaving Ormonde in hope 
for a brief time that Spain might reengage. The defeats suffered by Spain in the War of the 
Quadruple Alliance foreclosed such hopes, which died once the peace was signed and the 
Jacobites chief partner, Alberoni, fell from grace. Yet, was all of this caused by one storm? 
At the same time Spain received information about the damaged fleet it also came under 
attack. Had a storm in fact ruined the hopes and plans of Spain and the Jacobites or had 
Spanish support waned over the course of planning the rebellion? 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5: Weather: A cut-off low, the new Protestant Wind 
While the rest of Europe waited on peace, Spain and the Jacobites prepared for war. 
The Spanish fleet left Cadiz on March 9, (NS) 1719.
200
 Its destination, Cape Finisterre, Spain 
to rendezvous with the Duke of Ormonde and any extra men and supplies he had gathered. 
After a few weeks delay, time was running out for the expedition to surprise the British, and 
if an element of the surprise had been lost, the British still did not know exactly where the 
expeditionary force would land and thus had dispersed their defensive forces out. Speed and 
secrecy were crucial to the success of the expedition. Upon reaching Cape Finisterre, the 
Spanish fleet was to sail north, towards western England. 
March 27, 1719, 70 leagues west of Cape Finisterre, Spain 
  Seventy leagues off shore, the men of the small Spanish Armada fought against time, 
weather, and low supplies. In the twenty days since departing Cadiz on March 7 (NS), the 
men saw bad weather and stormy days, but what happened to them in the early morning of 
March 27 (NS) was unlike anything for which they had prepared. Starting in those early 
hours, the men of the Armada were exposed to a storm that did more damage to Spanish 
hopes and ambitions than any other since the great Armada of 1588. The Armada of 1719 
became engulfed by a storm covering the whole western part of Europe. A massive cut-off 
low pressure system wreaked havoc throughout the Atlantic and Western Europe. For two 
days, the Spanish sailors fought against the storm. Once the storm ended, the fleet dealt with 
its precarious situation. Scattered across the Atlantic, running low on supplies, struggling to 
stay afloat, and losing men to disease and dehydration, the ships of the small Spanish Armada 
                                                          
200
 Dates will appear as they did in their original source. In parenthesis, there will be either 
NS for the Gregorian calendar and OS for the Julian or the date that an event occurred in the 
other place. For instance on March 27 (NS) would appear as March 16 (OS).  
 81 
 
sailed back to the closest ports (Lisbon and Cadiz among others) they could find along the 
Iberian Peninsula.  
 Once the ships of the Armada arrived in the various ports along the Iberian coast, the 
ambitious expedition to invade Britain appeared over, but a smaller, diversionary expedition 
that had sailed earlier landed in Scotland. In response, Alberoni quickly reassembled his men 
and supplies intending to reattempt the invasion of western England, but France’s invasion of 
Catalonia in April forced him to hold back his troops and it was never reattempted. 
Therefore, because the weather prevented the arrival of the main Spanish fleet from invading 
Britain, the importance of the weather cannot be overlooked in this situation. From reading 
weather data from before and after March 1719 (the time when the storm hit the Spanish 
fleet) and examining the general preceding weather patterns one can get an understanding of 
the risks Spain was willing to take. If the storm that wrecked the Spanish fleet was something 
unusual then Spain risked little in sailing, but if the weather was usually poor this time of 
year and storms were common, then Spain took a huge gamble, which would prompt the 
question why? By collecting weather data from the early eighteenth century and 
reconstructing the storm that wrecked the Spanish fleet, then can these questions be 
answered.  
 The Spanish captains caught in the storm tell us little about the storm responsible for 
delaying the major Spanish invasion of Britain. Upon returning to Iberia, they gave brief 
accounts of their journey. Their reports, located in the Stuart Papers today, give only a few 
clues. The captains related that their ships were damaged in a sizeable storm that lasted for 
two days, but there were only a few specific references to what was damaged on their 
ships.
201
 The captains stated that men died, but focused more on the large numbers of horses 
that died in the storm or were later thrown overboard to preserve water. The captains put 
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most emphasis on the harsh conditions after the storm in which there was little water or food. 
The only other important weather detail provided by the Spanish reports was the wind 
direction. One report stated that the storm came out of the northeast.
202
 A second report stated 
that the ships were unable to sail into Cape Finisterre because the winds were against them 
signifying a northerly, easterly, or northeast wind.
203
 In fact, most of what we know about the 
severity of the storm comes from other European ships sailing in the Atlantic at the same time 
as the Spanish fleet.  
 Reports out of Lisbon printed in the British newspapers help provide a fuller account 
of the storm and the extent of the damage. These reports gave the Spanish fleet little chance 
of survival once the storm passed. Many in London cited providence as the reason for the 
Spanish Armada’s destruction.204 One report from Lisbon printed in London on April 25, 
confirmed the reports made by the Spanish captains. At one in the morning on March 27 (16) 
a storm which lasted for two days damaged much of the Spanish Armada. The report stated 
that the Commodore, a Spanish ship carrying 64 guns lost all of its masts and threw 
overboard the guns of its quarter and upper deck to avoid sinking.
205
 
This chapter will provide the first full account of the powerful storm, or Protestant 
Wind (as described in Britain
206
), that damaged the Spanish fleet and, secondly, will assess 
the likelihood that the Spanish or the Jacobites could have foreseen this event based upon 
their knowledge of weather patterns in 1719, an issue which bears on our interpretation of 
their skill in planning as well as their daring and commitment to their ambitious plan to 
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invade Britain and overthrow the Hanoverian monarch.
207
 The previous paragraphs show that 
the records provided by the Spanish ships caught in the storm provide almost no data for 
reconstructing the size and strength of the storm. Alone, these reports do little except to 
verify a storm damaged some of the Armada. The strength of the storm; whether it was a 
small gale or something bigger remains unknown. A comparison of this storm with other 
weather records will show how often this type of storm or weather event occurred near Spain 
(also in the Atlantic or Mediterranean) and indicate how likely it was that the Spanish and the 
Jacobites could have prepared for it. After the weather is reconstructed then a significant 
question can be answered; to what extent was Spain willing to help the Jacobites and at what 
cost? By showing the size, severity, and oddity (or not) of this storm it can tell us a lot about 
Spain’s intentions, since they are not clearly revealed in Alberoni’s extant papers.208 Once 
answered, this information can help us to determine how importantly the Jacobite Rebellion 
of 1719 factored into Spain’s plans in the Mediterranean during the War of the Quadruple 
Alliance.   
  Much of the secondary work on the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion accepts that a storm 
caused significant damage to the Spanish Armada destined to sail for western England. 
William Dickson in The Jacobite Attempt of 1719 included the reports of two Spanish 
captains (mentioned earlier) giving their limited accounts of what happened on the night of 
March 27 (NS) until they made it back to port around April 9 (NS). From these reports, 
historians have accepted that the Spanish fleet sustained enough damage to postpone the 
expedition. Because this event was so significant to the early success or failure of the 
expedition, it is odd that there is no detailed report verifying the severity of the storm since 
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the reports of the Spanish captains are so vague. Because the meteorological records kept in 
the early eighteenth century are few in number, as of yet there is no account, model, or 
reconstruction of the weather for March 27-29 (NS) 1719. There is no detailed weather map 
from 1719 so it is necessary to reconstruct it. By using newspaper accounts, diaries, and the 
limited weather records kept at the time, it is possible to reconstruct a detailed account of the 
weather for a small period. 
March 30, 1719: 70 leagues west of Cape Finisterre, Spain 
The Spanish fleet was not alone in the Atlantic seventy leagues west of Spain in late 
March 1719. Thomas Rose, master of the Jenny Galley of London was located near the 
Spanish fleet. In late March, caught in a strong storm with easterly winds, Rose and the crew 
of the Jenny Galley spotted a large ship of approximately fifty guns with it masts badly 
damaged. The flag of the unknown ship had a red cross and Rose mistook this as a sign of an 
English vessel. To their dismay, Rose and the crew of the Jenny Galley were shocked when 
the red cross turned out to have a Spanish pendant in the middle of it and immediately turned 
away from the Spanish ship.
209
 Rose’s account is not just of a close encounter for the Jenny 
Galley, but also gives an account (uninfluenced by Spain or Spanish power) of the easterly 
winds that both the small Spanish Armada and the Jenny Galley encountered.
210
 
The Speedwell out of London was also in close proximity to the Spanish fleet. The 
reports from Captain George Shelvocke of the Speedwell lack the detail of Rose’s, but he 
recorded the bad weather they encountered during their journey from London to the Canaries. 
They left London on February 24 (March 7) and arrived in the Canaries on March 17 (28). 
The route the Speedwell took to get to the Canaries put it in the same area as the Spanish 
Fleet. This means that during their voyage (February 24- March 17 (OS) or March 27 (NS)) 
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the winds were most likely blowing from a northerly direction if the Speedwell was able to 
sail to the Canaries.
211
 This also coincides with the Spanish captain’s report of a wind that 
prevented them from sailing into Cape Finisterre. The previous two accounts, as simple as 
they may seem let us know that there was a storm system or weather event and Spain did not 
create an excuse to avoid helping the Jacobites. Because other countries confirmed that there 
was a storm that damaged Spanish ships, we can now move on to reconstructing the storm. 
The northerly and easterly winds reported in the last few accounts help to visualize the 
direction that the storm was moving. For example, northerly and easterly winds signify a 
storm coming from the north and east and heading south and possibly west. The most 
important details needed to reconstruct the weather are wind direction, temperature, 
barometric pressure, precipitation, and even visibility. Each type of weather system has 
certain features and characteristics that distinguish it from other systems. The data collected, 
clearly indicates that the storm system that struck the Spanish Armada was a cut-off low 
pressure system: northerly and easterly winds in the Atlantic are hallmarks of a cut-off low.   
Cut-off low pressure system 
It can be very difficult to reconstruct past weather events. In 1719, there was no 
observation post that collected weather data and published it. There were, however, private 
individuals who recorded data. Unfortunately, finding them today is difficult. The records for 
Britain have a gap in the years 1717-1722 and in most European countries the records are 
nonexistent or yet to be rediscovered.
212
 Without these records, reconstructing the weather 
from this period is challenging. Nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct the weather of a 
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particular time and place(s) with the right data. Surveying the data of wind direction, 
temperature, precipitation, barometric pressure, and sky conditions allows us to reconstruct 
the weather for approximately a ten day period between March 23 and April 1 1719 (NS) 
(March 12-March 21 OS).  
The characteristics of a cut-off low pressure system are distinct. A COL (cut-off low) 
has significant features distinguishing it from other European storms. First, the wind patterns 
of a COL are distinct, moving in a counter clockwise direction (in the northern hemisphere). 
Since most European storms move from west to east, it is likely that the wind patterns in the 
areas affected by a COL will be opposite from their typical directions. The second 
characteristic of a COL typically involves temperature and weather conditions. Once the 
initial cold front passes through the area affected by the COL, the days after this occurs have 
significantly colder temperatures, and clear weather conditions. Therefore, we must compare 
the typical characteristics of a COL with the weather of the storm from March 1719.  
 The development of a COL starts out like most European storms. Storms in Europe 
move from west to east. A COL (cut-off low) begins as a low pressure or storm system 
moving across Europe from west to east carried along by the jet stream. The jet stream carries 
low pressure systems across Western Europe normally within a matter of a few days. In the 
mid- latitudes, low pressure systems evolve in a life-cycle that, while aging, culminates in 
lower pressure and stronger winds as cold air wraps into the center of the system. From here, 
the “mature” low pressure system becomes stationary and is “cut-off” from the steering flow 
of the jet stream. The jet stream is responsible for carrying a weather system east and without 
it the low pressure system stalls or sits in one place.
213
 When a COL sits over the 
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Mediterranean, as was the case in March 1719, it pulls in moisture from the Mediterranean 
and increases in size and severity.
214
 A COL can sit in one place for a few days or a few 
weeks causing lower than average temperatures and heavy precipitation in the areas 
surrounding the low pressure center. COLs are common in the Mediterranean today and 
usually occur in the summer, fall, and early winter with the heavy precipitation during these 
months.
215 
A recent COL occurred during September 2011 and affected large portions of the 
United States bringing several days of cool temperatures and heavy precipitation.
216
 A more 
detailed explanation of COLs and their occurrence in the Mediterranean today will be 
discussed later in the chapter (also see the articles in footnotes 212-15). 
Because a COL has a particular set of significant characteristics, it is possible to 
match these characteristics with the data found in table 5.1 to explain why the 1719 system 
was a COL. First, because the winds of a COL spin in a counter clockwise direction (in the 
Northern Hemisphere), the normal wind patterns of the areas affected by this system will 
change. The newspaper reports published out of Britain used in table 5.1 all provided details 
of wind direction before, during, and after the storm. By looking at table 5.1, it is clear that 
there was a change in wind direction. The normal wind patterns before and after the storm in 
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Britain were westerly and southerly winds. During the time in question (March 10-20 (OS)), 
the winds changed to the north and east. This signifies a system that had an abnormal wind 
pattern. Persistent northeast wind directions, in combination with the evidence of strong 
winds, are consistent with a COL centered to the southeast of the location of the northeasterly 
wind observations (the observations were located in Britain and off the western coast of 
Spain). From the typical size of a COL circulation, the center of the COL was likely located 
in the western Mediterranean Sea. 
The newspapers were not the only ones recording the weather in March 1719. An 
unlikely person, William Byrd II a planter from Virginia and member of the House of 
Burgesses kept a diary during his time in London. When he was not too busy reading, 
praying, gambling, practicing his Greek, or chasing women, Byrd monitored and recorded the 
weather. Byrd, a surprising source revealed a great amount of detail about weather conditions 
in March 1719. His records on the days after the initial storm show that effect of the cold 
front (March 19-21 (March 30-April 1)); writing about clear skies, violent winds, and cold 
temperatures.
217
 Byrd also provided details of the weather during the initial storm. From 
March 14-18 (25-29), the weather was cold and windy with easterly winds (see table 5.1). 
March 20 is exceptionally important, as we will later see because he stated that the wind was 
violent from the northeast.
218
 According to Byrd’s records after March 26 (April 6), the 
weather returned to normal (warmer and westerly winds). Byrd’s account makes it conclusive 
that the winds changed to a northeast direction opposite of what they had been prior to the 
storm. 
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Table 5.1 Weather data chart (Dates are in Old Style with New Style in Parenthesis)
 
 
Britain Wind Direction 
and observations 
France, 
Paris 
observatory 
Pressure and 
general 
observations 
Spain/The 
Atlantic  
Ships Logs located 
near Cape 
Finisterre, Spain 
March 
12 (23) 
Deal: NE March 12 
(23) 
1026.5 (mb) March 12 
(23) 
 
March 
13 (24) 
Plymouth: E March 13 
(24) 
1020.4 (mb) March 13 
(24) 
 
March 
14 (25) 
Falmouth: E March 14 
(25) 
1011.3 (mb) March 14 
(25) 
 
March 
15 (26) 
London: NE 
 
March 15 
(26) 
1011.3 (mb) March 15 
(26) 
Jenny Galley report: 
Strong Gale of 
Easterly Winds 
March 
16 (27) 
London: NW 
Falmouth: S 
March 16 
(27) 
1008.2 (mb) March 16 
(27) 
Spanish Ship logs 
Wind: NE 
March 
17 (28) 
London: NE March 17 
(28) 
1011.2 (mb) March 17 
(28) 
Spanish Ship Logs 
Wind: NE 
March 
18 (29) 
London: NE March 18 
(29) 
1014.3 (mb) March 18 
(29) 
Spanish Ship Logs 
Wind: NE 
March 
19 (30) 
London: NE 
Aberdeen and 
Glasgow, Scotland, 
West Chester and 
Oxford, England: 
Lights of all colors 
observed in the sky 
March 19 
(30) 
1017.3 (mb) 
Meteor observed 
in sky, clear 
skies. 
March 19 
(30) 
Jenny Galley: Wind: 
Strong E 
March 
20 (31) 
London: Violently 
NE  
Deal: Wind Blows 
Hard 
March 20 
(31) 
1008.2 (mb) March 20 
(31) 
 
March 
21(Apr
il 1) 
London: NE March 21 
(April 1) 
1017.2 (mb) 
Comet Observed, 
clear skies 
March 21 
(April 1)
 *
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The Paris Observatory was one of the few institutions that recorded the weather in 
March 1719, whose records are extant.
219
 Table 5.1 lists the barometric pressure for each day 
over a ten-day period. Around noon each day, the Paris Observatory recorded the barometric 
pressure. The barometric pressure is important because when a low pressure system 
approaches the barometric pressure drops. When a low pressure system leaves, the barometric 
pressure rises. From table 5.1, we can see that before the storm on March 27 (16) the pressure 
dropped. On March 29 and 30 (18, 19) the barometric pressure rose, but on March 31 (20), 
however, the pressure dropped again. The changes in pressure most likely occurred because a 
cold front moved through Britain in conjunction with the larger low pressure system (COL) 
that was stalled out and strengthened in the Mediterranean.  The pressure readings from these 
ten days signify that there was a storm system that might have abated slightly on (March 31). 
The pressure dropping and the strong winds on that day suggest a strengthening of the cut off 
low.
220
  
The second characteristic of a COL affects temperature and weather conditions. Once 
the initial wave of the cold front goes through it is usually replaced by clear weather, a drastic 
drop in temperature, and strong winds. William Byrd’s journal entry already showed a 
change in wind direction, strong winds, clear skies, and cold temperatures in the first days of 
the COL in Britain. Other places in Europe confirm Byrd’s account of the weather. British 
and Parisian newspapers reported that there were bright lights and objects in the sky on the 
nights of March 19-21 (March 30-April 1 in France).
221
 Some reports attributed these 
sightings to comets, others said that there was an eclipse, and still others made it appear as 
though they described seeing the northern lights. Regardless of what actually caused the 
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sightings there the skies needed to be clear. The confirmation these reports provided of clear 
skies in the days after the first wave of the COL, in correlation with the cold winds in Britain 
from William Byrd’s diary strongly suggest that a massive cold air front came into Northern 
and Western Europe after the “stormy” days, commonly associated with a COL. 222  
France and Italy provided the final observations verifying the weather after the storm. 
Franz Arago’s Sämmtliche Werke stated that the winter of 1719 was unusually warm. The 
trees and flowers in France and Italy were blossoming in February and March. These 
blossoms were short-lived, however, because there was a large cold spell at the end of March 
with frosts that killed the blossoms.
223
 The large cold spell in France and Italy occurred as the 
cut-off low was in Europe. Again, a cut-off low is associated with a large mass of cold air. 
This report of a cold spell and frosts show that a large cold air mass affected vast portions of 
Europe, typical of the COL. Since the weather conditions of March 1719 meet both the 
characteristics and associated features of a cut off low pressure system then a cut-off low 
pressure system centered in the western Mediterranean Sea, covering much of western 
Europe, was likely responsible for the storm that struck the small Spanish Armada. We know 
the COL was centered over the Mediterranean because the reports out of London and of the 
ships located within the COL reported an east or northeast wind, and cold and windy 
conditions stretching from London to Spain for several days. All of these signify weather 
conditions similar to those of a COL centered in the Western Mediterranean.  
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Records of today to reconstruct the past 
Since we now know what happened to the Spanish fleet the next step is to examine the 
oddity of the cut-off low pressure system in March 1719 and determine how well Alberoni 
and Ormonde prepared for or factored in the weather. Data of weather patterns in modern 
Spain can presumably help explain how common a COL was in 1719. This last step is the 
easiest to compare and will be examined first along with Spain’s knowledge of weather 
patterns in 1719.  
Assuming that seasonal weather patterns from 1719 and the early eighteenth century 
are similar to today, we can take the records from cut-off lows in Iberia today to assess how 
commonly COL’s occur in March. Cut-off lows are common in Spain today (see the articles 
in footnotes 212-215). A 2005 report on a study of COLs from 1958-1998, Climatological 
Features of Cutoff Low Systems in the Northern Hemisphere examined the time of year that 
COLs occurred and found that most COLs occur in the summer, fall, and early winter 
months. The most active time of year are the summer months with 44.6 percent of European 
COLs occurring compared to 10.6 percent in winter. Based upon this study March was 
usually a calm month for COLs, but some still occurred then.
 224
 
It is important to remember although a minor COL can be a common occurrence 
lasting a couple of days in Spain; the COL that struck the Spanish fleet in 1719 was not a 
typical COL. M-C. Llasat, F. Mart in, and A. Barrera, wrote in their 2007 article From the 
C          “K              ” (C            )        C  -Off Low: The Case of September 
1971 in Spain as an Example of Their Role in Heavy Rainfalls that “if the cold pools [the 
center of a COL] were close to the Mediterranean (not often the case), the worst-affected 
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zone was usually to the west or northwest.” 225 This type of COL should not be confused with 
a typical COL. The strength of the two storms is greatly different with the one centered over 
the Mediterranean being significantly stronger than others which are not centered over land 
or the Atlantic.  
Because of the size, duration, and severity of the COL that struck the Spanish fleet it 
was irregular of a typical COL and the center of that COL stalled out over the Mediterranean 
(the location of stronger COLs). Because it stalled out over the Mediterranean, the COL 
pulled in more moisture and grew stronger. Therefore, the Spanish fleet had two things going 
against it. Not only was the COL that hit it less common (e.g., a COL that formed over the 
Mediterranean in March), but the area in the Atlantic where the Spanish ships were located 
(to the west and northwest of the low) would be the most likely region to be affected by the 
cold frontal zone, associated with the strongest wind and stormiest conditions!
 226
 In 
comparing today’s data on COLs with the COL of March 1719, it appears that March was the 
best time to sail if an expedition was to go out.  
Determining what Spain knew about weather patterns in 1719 becomes a little more 
difficult. Much of the work done by scholars has focused on Spain’s knowledge of weather 
and wind patterns for sailing to the East and West Indies. This does little to help our 
understanding of the best times to sail from Spain to Britain. To find this we must look to 
another famous Spanish Armada, the 1588 Spanish Armada, which bears an eerie 
resemblance to the 1719 Armada. The 1588 Armada also attempted an invasion of Britain 
and sustained serious damage to its fleet because of weather (for more information on the 
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1588 Armada see chapter 6). What is important to note out of this event, however, is that 
scholars have studied Spain’s knowledge of weather patterns used when sailing to England. 
What they found was that Spanish mariners frequently sailed to England and back in the fall 
or winter.
227
 This suggests that from the knowledge of Spanish mariners the best time to sail 
to England and back was in the fall or winter. In addition, many Spanish sailors used 
almanacs to assist them.
228 
Almanacs such as Lunario nuevo, perpetuo, y general, y 
pronostico de los tiempos, provided information on the moons, the seasons, what to expect 
during each month of the year and during each sign of the Zodiac, and even provided basic 
knowledge of sailing. This almanac stated that the weather in February would be humid and 
moist and in March, it would be hot and dry.
229
 Therefore, based upon today’s weather data, 
and the knowledge the Spanish naval commanders had of the sea at that time of year, Spain 
was not gambling much by sailing during the Hilary term and when they ultimately sailed in 
March.  
The next step is to examine weather patterns of the past and put the storm of 1719 in a 
context with what people at that time had observed as a common COL. This step is more 
challenging since there are fewer records to help understand the weather patterns of the early 
eighteenth century than there are for understanding today’s weather patterns. Nevertheless, 
we can judge some weather patterns by what people said about the storm when it occurred. 
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Other ships who sailed near the Spanish fleet commented on the unusual nature of this storm. 
The captain of a French vessel who sailed past the Spanish fleet days before the storm struck 
stated that he had not seen weather that bad in over twenty years.
 230 
The French captain also 
believed the Spanish fleet perished at sea because even with his experience at sea, the French 
captain struggled to make it to land. Although it is only one report, the account of the French 
captain makes the case for the COL of 1719 being both severe and something unusual in that 
time of year or for that matter for the previous 20 years. Given his experience, it suggests that 
if storms of this severity were a regular occurrence then he would not have been sailing off 
the coast of Spain in March 1719.  
Franz Arago’s Sammtliche Werke stated that the weather in France and Italy was 
unusually warm that winter up until the end of March. In January for instance, there was only 
one day below freezing.
231
 The report of the trees blossoming in winter show that it was 
unusually warm and that the weather was abnormal for winter.
232 
 If Ormonde and Alberoni 
planned an expedition during a warm winter, it suggests that they did not factor any large 
storms associated with winter and cold weather into their plans. Because the ability to predict 
the weather was only in its initial stages by 1719, there was little help in preparing for storms 
except by patterns based on daily observations and common weather patterns of previous 
years. Therefore, if Ormonde and Alberoni only viewed what happened around them then the 
weather of the Mediterranean and Atlantic did not appear to be a problem.  
This voyage was not solely intended for the coast of Spain, the voyage to Britain was 
long and the weather in Britain was just as important. Studies of weather patterns in Britain 
during the early eighteenth century although spotty because of the large gap in records also 
suggested that March was a good month to sail. A 2008 study of British ship logs from 1685-
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1750 examined storms near the British Isles. The report stated that from 1700-1709 and 
1730-1739 the number of storms mentioned in these log books dramatically drop during 
March. In fact, from 1700-1709 March had the fewest occurrences of storms mentioned in 
any of the log books. Based upon this report the weather patterns in Britain in the years 
before the storm suggested that March was an ideal time to attack. Since basic observations 
were what the Spanish and the Jacobites used to judge and predict the weather, the weather 
patterns before the storm as well as the precedent of previous years would have suggested 
that March was an ideal time to sail to Britain.
233
 In other words, Alberoni and Ormonde 
chose well and deliberately in selecting the Hilary term (between January and March) as the 
preferred time for the Jacobites to sail. Not only did they try to sail during the Hilary term for 
the 1719 rebellion but they also sailed during the Hilary term in the 1708 invasion and in 
December for the fifteen. From this, it appeared that the Jacobites knew the best time to sail 
or at least had set a precedent on what time of year worked best to land an invasion in 
Britain.
234
  
It does not appear that Ormonde or Alberoni did not have much concern for the 
weather. The two planners assumed one of three things. That the weather would not have 
been a problem (the most likely case given the success of the earlier invasion that sailed 
during the Hilary term or end of March), that they could not have done anything about the 
weather even if it had been a problem, or they simply never even considered it (which is 
highly unlikely given the failure of other Spanish “Armadas” because of weather). The most 
likely scenario was the first or second option because in their letters they do not mention the 
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weather until it became a problem. At the end of February around the 24 (NS) the fleet was 
ready to depart but was kept in port by contrary winds and bad weather. This was the first 
time that weather was given serious consideration by the planners of the expedition. As the 
ships waited, Alberoni and Ormonde made a contingency plan to meet at Coruna or Cape 
Finisterre if the weather became too bad.
235
 This was a last-minute consideration, however, as 
the ships were already prepared to sail. The lack of consideration of the weather in these 
letters does not suggest an unpreparedness of the planners, but rather shows they had no need 
to prepare for the weather based upon the data of weather patterns at the time and especially 
for the winter of 1718/1719. The winter was warm and storms were less frequent in March so 
the planners felt no need to prepare or make a plan for bad weather until it affected them.  
With all the scheming and thought that Alberoni, Ormonde, and the Jacobites put into 
planning the expedition it was illogical for them to ignore the weather if they felt it was going 
to be a problem. Clearly, they did not feel it would hinder the invasion and made a last 
minute plan to assemble at Coruña or Cape Finisterre just in case there was bad weather. 
Based upon their weather observations before the fleet was supposed to leave Coruña there 
was some unexpected fog and this is when they began to factor in the weather. Because the 
storm damaged the Spanish fleet and from the data it appears that the storm was unexpected, 
if nothing else, we know that Spain was serious about helping the Jacobites. The storm was 
not just a feigned effort by Spain to withdraw their support after invasion from France and the 
rest of the Quadruple Alliance appeared imminent. Spain in fact contributed a significant 
number of troops (5,000), or at least a significant number of what troops they had remaining, 
and arms for the invasion and risked invasion itself if the expedition was unsuccessful, which 
is precisely what happened: Britain invaded (Galicia) shortly after the Spanish fleet had been 
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shredded by the “Protestant Wind.” Spain appears to have been serious in their attempts to 
aid the Jacobites.  
Ultimately, the weather derailed the plans of both the Spanish and the Jacobites 
(which were quick and rushed, thus easily upset).
236
 Yet because Spain was, as we have 
determined, so determined in their attempt to “aid” the Jacobites while conditions looked 
favorable, we can turn to address the fundamental questions: Was it actually a Jacobite 
Rebellion? Or had the Jacobites simply become a tool manipulated by the hands of Spanish 
masters to prune British power and to further their ambitions in the Mediterranean and in 
Europe, one to be discarded when the opportune season had passed? What about the support 
that the Jacobites were supposed to have in Britain once they landed? Why did it not 
materialize?  Was there actually going to be a full-scale rebellion? If the weather had not 
interfered with the planned invasion did Ormonde, Alberoni, and Philip actually believe that 
the Jacobites with Spanish help could take over Britain and thus complete a Jacobite 
Rebellion, or was it just a diversion to take Britain out of the War of the Quadruple Alliance?  
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Figure 5.2  
A reconstructed cut-off low pressure system centered in the western Mediterranean. The areas in the green circle 
are most likely to receive precipitation. The white arrows are the surface winds based upon observations from 
1719.  
 Chapter 6: A Rebellion like the Rest 
With the narrative of the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion completed and the demonstration 
proving that a significant and rightly unexpected storm system (COL) wrecked the Spanish 
fleet, it is time to answer the biggest and perhaps most important question of this thesis: was 
the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 truly a “Jacobite” Rebellion? A majority of this final chapter 
will be devoted to answering this question and several smaller questions that coincide with it 
such as: Could the Jacobites really have taken over Britain?  What were the potential 
consequences if they had won? Would Spain have just given Britain to the Jacobites if they 
had won? And finally, what consequences did the failure of the 1719 rebellion have for the 
Jacobites, Spain, and the rest of Europe. 
A Jacobite Rebellion? 
 Although it was and still is called a Jacobite Rebellion, the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion 
was not exactly “Jacobite.” In fact, the Jacobites did little to fund the expedition monetarily 
or via troops, and although they intended to have a strong showing once the invasion landed 
this ultimately never occurred. Spain, however, supplied a majority of the forces, ships, and 
supplies for the invasion and even went as far as offering to fund Sweden’s part in the 
invasion. From just this data, it is clear who in the end was in charge, though, as shown 
above, early in the planning stages (April – October 1718), Alberoni and Spain were hardly 
interested in the Jacobite’s overtures. As the plans progressed and when events began going 
against Spain and the Jacobites, Ormonde’s letters revealed who was actually in charge of the 
invasion. Although Ormonde (and the Jacobites) was leading the men into battle and planned 
the invasion, the final say in what happened or the final approval for what went on had to go 
through the Spanish government either through Cardinal Alberoni or King Philip. Ormonde’s 
letters from early April revealed this when he began panicking about the landing in England, 
stating “je obeirai les ordres du Roy et que je ne songerai plus a l Ecosse et qu il ne sera pas 
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ma faute sy nous ne debarquerons pas en Angleterre.” 237 This statement shows a frustrated 
Ormonde who had no choice but to follow the orders of Alberoni.  
Once Sweden was out of the invasion plans, Spain (Alberoni and Philip) appeared to 
take over control of the invasion. Without Swedish help, Ormonde appeared to no longer 
have complete faith in how the expedition was being drawn up. In his letters from April 4 
(NS) through April 9 (NS) Ormonde started to falter in his support of the planned invasion.
238
 
Ormonde believed that the invasion would not work if Britain was aware of what was going 
on.
239
 By this time (early April in Spain which was late March in Britain), Britain knew every 
detail of the expedition except the exact departure date and the exact location of where the 
invasion was landing. Ormonde told Alberoni and Philip that he was landing in Scotland and 
calling off the English invasion. He even wrote to James telling him that “I think there is 
nothing to be done but the going of Scotland” because of the delays caused by the weather. 240 
To Ormonde under the circumstances it would be better to land in Scotland than in England.
 
This made it appear as though he had some power and control over the planning, but 
Alberoni and Philip were both against this idea. The next letter from Alberoni and the one 
Ormonde wrote back had a different tone, and Ormonde clearly is lower in command after 
Alberoni and Philip told him he was to land in England at all costs.
241
 By the next letter, they 
backed down and told Ormonde that he could land in Scotland only if England proved 
impossible and he begrudgingly agreed, “Je ne manquerai pas de faire tout ce qui me sera 
possible pour obéir aux ordres de sa Majesté en tachant de debarquer en Angleterre mais si 
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cela se trouve impracticable Je ferai tout ce que je puis pour mettre pied a terre en Ecosse ce 
qui ne sera que la derniere resource.
”242 
Nonetheless, it was clear that the real power 
controlling the expedition by this point was Spain under Philip and Alberoni.  
 It must have been at this point that Ormonde felt the strain of leading the expedition 
and being caught between his duty to James and Spain on one hand and his desire to serve the 
Jacobites on the other. Both James Francis Edward Stuart (like his father and later his son) 
and Spain wanted to strike directly at England. For them the main purpose of the invasion 
was to ignite a rebellion in England on the western coast and lead it to capture London and 
the crown, but Ormonde and many of the Jacobite generals viewed the rebellion differently. 
One major problem of the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion and the Jacobite movement as a whole 
was a conflict of interests between James and his followers. James, like his father and later 
his son, refused to break up his “kingdom” in exchange for foreign aid.243 
During other Jacobite Rebellions, the French had previously offered full assistance in 
exchange for control of Ireland.
244
 James, however, wanted control of all three kingdoms or 
no kingdom at all. Therefore, his men planned an expedition with the main goal of 
conquering England, hoping that in the process, the other two kingdoms would join him. His 
generals and commanders, however, viewed things in a different light. Ormonde was content 
to invade Scotland alone and establish a foothold there especially once Spain was the only 
force backing the Jacobites and Ormonde had learned that Britain was aware of the planned 
invasion.
245
 Ormonde’s letters to Alberoni and some to James in early April clearly show his 
frustration and complaints with the state of the overall expedition. The conflicting goal 
between James and Philip of Spain on one side and Ormonde and James’s other top generals 
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(Marischal and Tullibardine) on the other brought tension to the plan. By March, when the 
main expedition was to sail to England, the chances of it making it to English soil and setting 
up a successful landing were small because the Royal Navy was coasting along the waters 
outside of England and troops had been sent to stop an invasion in western England. If the 
Armada sailed to Scotland instead, there was a greater probability of it landing and becoming 
an effective military force in Britain, assuming that people came out in support for James, but 
instead the Jacobite command was divided.    
Ormonde’s confusion and the orders he was given are just more examples of the 
control and influence that Spain had over the Jacobites in the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. Yet, 
despite all of Spain’s control over planning, funding, and troops for the rebellion, when it 
comes right down to it the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 was truly a “Jacobite” Rebellion. Yes, 
the majority of funding and troops that participated in the rebellion were in large part 
supplied by foreign sources, and this may seem like solid grounds to declare it a Spanish 
invasion using the Jacobites as a tool for their ambitions, which in many ways it was. Spain 
had its own ambitions and plans for Europe and the Mediterranean. A Jacobite Rebellion was 
the best way for it to further those goals. In order to accomplish those goals Spain supplied 
the bulk of the invasion forces to Britain (5,000 men and 15,000 plus arms), but the potential 
return of this “investment” was greater than Spain could have imagined. It is hard to tell if 
Spain would have just given Britain over to the Stuarts once the invasion was complete since 
so much changed between the time of the planning of the rebellion and the initial “launch” of 
the rebellion (although it is doubtful the invasion would have been successful enough for that 
to occur, but it will be discussed later in the chapter). Odds are that it never would have come 
to that point since the invasion was unlikely to succeed once Swedish assistance was no 
longer available to Ormonde and Alberoni.  
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Despite all of this, to call the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 anything but a Jacobite 
rebellion would be a mistake based upon the precedent set by previous historians as what 
classifies as a Jacobite Rebellion. No, there is no scale or system that measures how much 
involvement the Jacobites themselves had to put in for the rebellion to be considered a 
Jacobite one, but based upon the Rebellions that are “truly” Jacobite (1707-1708, 1715, and 
1745) the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 fits into this category. After all since the uprising of 
1690 (even this rebellion was largely supported by, and failed because of French aid) when 
had there ever been a Jacobite Rebellion that did not rely in large part on foreign assistance? 
The forty-five came close with a large portion of the troops being Scottish and English 
Jacobites, but even then the assistance of the French was still necessary to secure a victory, 
which ultimately never materialized. The Jacobites relied heavily upon foreign aid for the 
entirety of the Jacobite movement, and the 1719 rebellion was no different. Although the 
1719 Jacobite Rebellion might not have been self-sufficient or even able to get off the ground 
without Spanish help (the failed uprising in Scotland helped illustrate this), its ultimate goals 
still were those timeless ones of the Jacobite cause and therefore, based upon previous 
precedent must be called a Jacobite Rebellion.  
Who is to Blame? 
 As with most failed political, social, or military expeditions there has to be fault 
somewhere or with someone. The first target may well have been the Duke of Ormonde if the 
same historians who wrote about the fifteen worked on the 1719 rebellion. In fact, one of the 
major problems in most histories of the Jacobites is the negative view scholars and historians 
have of the Duke of Ormonde. The previous chapters, however, have shown that Ormonde 
did everything in his power to piece together the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. Yet his 
accomplishments from the 1719 rebellion go unnoticed by historians and most tend to focus 
on his failures during the fifteen. In many ways, however, Ormonde was ahead of his time or 
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at least ahead of his peers in planning the 1719 rebellion. For example, in October 1718, he 
advised Mar and James that the invasion forces would have to depart before the end of Hilary 
term to have the best chance of succeeding
 
and urged them to talk to Spain immediately.
246 
The significance of this passage can be interpreted two ways. First, it may indicate that the 
Ormonde was an observant student of the weather and knew based upon weather patterns that 
it would have been best to sail during the Hilary term, since there are fewer major storms 
during the winter months. It also shows he understood Spain was looking for an immediate 
response to the British attack at Cape Passaro and saw it as a favorable opportunity to further 
the Jacobite cause. If the Jacobites were to wait then the war might end and they would miss 
their chance.
247
 Thus, Ormonde wrote to James showing him the need to push Alberoni to 
start the expedition.
248
 He feared that if Britain and Spain came to peace then James would 
lose out.
249
 Both interpretations indicate that Ormonde realized action was urgent; when he 
wrote to James on October 17, they had not even “planned” the expedition yet. When it came 
to planning, Ormonde appears to plan as well as anyone, which goes against his poor 
reputation for planning and leading given to him by historians of the fifteen. 
Ormonde also had insight into action in the field. Having served with William in the 
“Glorious” Revolution and with Britain during the War of Spanish Succession, Ormonde had 
enough combat experience to know how to win. One particular aspect that Ormonde focused 
on during the planning of the invasion shows how well he understood fighting on the ground. 
In a letter to Cardinal Alberoni dated January 27, Ormonde showed his military skill asking 
Alberoni to supply the expedition with muskets of the same manufacture that had 
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interchangeable bayonets, and were of the same caliber; making it possible to quickly fix any 
musket with the parts of another.
 250
 It might seem like common sense to have a military unit 
well supplied and outfitted correctly and uniformly, but in the early eighteenth century one 
might be surprised with the motely units that most countries sent into battle. His close 
attention to these finite details, which bedevil many forces on the battlefield, show that 
Ormonde was not negligent in preparing for an invasion and is not at fault for the failure of 
the rebellion.  
The blame for the failure of the rebellion falls on three things: the weather, loss of 
surprise, and Spain. The weather is the most obvious of culprits. The weather delayed the 
Armada from sailing out of Cadiz, Spain in February 1719, and it was the weather that 
wrecked the Spanish Armada off the coast of Cape Finisterre in late March. Delaying and 
then ultimately canceling the invasion. Ormonde himself blamed the weather for the defeat in 
August 1719.
251
 In the planners’ defense the weather was very difficult to predict in 1719, 
and the Jacobites followed the same precedent set by previous invasions, sailing or at least 
intending to launch the invasion during the Hilary term (1708 for example). Yet, to say that it 
was only the weather that prevented the 1719 invasion attempt from succeeding hides some 
of the serious weaknesses in the planning and execution of the invasion stemming from a lack 
of Spanish resources and the loss of surprise.  
Let us pretend for a minute that the weather did not intervene and the fleet gathered all 
the extra supplies off Corun a and sailed onto Britain. In doing so, the real problems (a lack of 
secrecy, uncertain support from British citizens, and a lack of Spanish resources) standing in 
the way of a successful invasion (besides the Royal Navy) become clear. After all, the 
invasion was no surprise and Britain was aware that something was a foot as early as October 
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when Stair wrote to Craggs about the possibility of Ormonde’s invasion as soon as he was 
rumored to have traveled to Spain. Despite all the attempts of Ormonde and the Jacobites to 
write in code and keep James uninformed of their plans, their plans still made it to Britain. 
Britain’s spies, especially Abbé Dubois, kept it well informed of what was afoot beginning in 
January 1719. Yet Britain did not take the invasion seriously until March 1719. On March 11 
(NS) Stair wrote to Craggs about the feeble attempts of the Jacobites to invade Britain.
252
 On 
March 26 (NS) it was a different story. Craggs was panicking and told Stair to get any person 
he could find ready to sail against Spain.
253
 If the weather had not delayed the expedition 
from sailing until March then the chances of a successful invasion would have even been 
greater.  
Could a rebellion have worked? 
Counterfactual history or history that looks at an issue or topic from a different 
perspective, that of what reasonably could have happened were one or more conditions 
changed to a plausible alternative, can be useful in thinking through the key factors that 
shaped the outcome of the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. The last few pages of this thesis will look 
at some of the possible consequences of a successful rebellion and what circumstances 
needed to be present for a victory of any kind to have occurred during the 1719 Jacobite 
Rebellion. Most of these events never occurred, but in presenting this information it can help 
show how important the Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 was and if it had been even a little bit 
more successful, the major changes it could have brought about for the future of Europe in 
the eighteenth century.  
 It is impossible to rule out the chance that the 1719 rebellion could have succeeded 
had it not been for the weather intervening, but that chance was small. We will never truly 
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know if it would have, but in all likelihood, the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion had little chance of 
succeeding for the Jacobites. The glimmer of hope the Jacobites had was that Britain had a 
small standing army. At its strongest point during peacetime Britain could assemble 25,000 
men and cavalry combined between England, Scotland, and Wales.
254
 Even with Britain 
having a small number of ready troops defending it the Jacobites needed an army to fight 
George I. A portion of the population was unhappy with George I and therefore potentially 
willing to join the Jacobites. The riots of 1714 and 1715, which occurred on the Jacobite, 
Williamite, and Hanoverian “holidays”, were brought about because of the discontent among 
some of the population because George I was in power. These riots had not stopped after the 
failure of the fifteen. There were anti-Hanoverian riots in 1716, 1717, and 1718.
255
 London 
police arrested anti-Hanoverian rioters in both 1717 and 1718.
256
 Ormonde believed that the 
Jacobites would have a strong showing once an army made it to England, while Craggs and 
Stair felt the opposite was true. The only direct evidence we have of the size of the Jacobite 
army is the approximately 1,200 men who showed up for the battle of Glenshiel. A small 
number even compared to the earlier rebellion of 1715. The number of the 1719 rebellion is a 
bit skewed, however, because as the Jacobites pointed out (Tullibardine), many were waiting 
on a large foreign army to show up before they joined in the rebellion. Furthermore after the 
rebellion failed there was another attempt to seize the throne; the Atterbury Plot of 1722 
(planning began in 1720). This plan was designed to seize the munitions from the Tower of 
London and then capture the royal family.
257
 There was clearly support for the Jacobites but 
the question of how much is unknown. The devotion to all of these plans leads to a quagmire 
for the Jacobites. The 1719 rebellion like the Atterbury plot had devoted followers who were 
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willing to die for their cause, but in both plans George I was never expected to be killed. He 
was always either captured or the rebellion would happen while he was in Hannover. If it 
came down to it, one can assume that the Jacobite would have killed George I to take the 
throne, but we cannot be certain of this. Even if their plan worked then the Jacobites (the 
Stuarts) would then be looking over their shoulders for someone to take the throne from 
them.   
 The real problem for the Jacobites was not finding men for an army; they could 
always find men who were unhappy with the current government and willing, in some 
degree, to support the Stuarts, who could promise the world in return for support. No, the real 
problem was what to do if they won. Granted there was a chance that the Spanish and 
Jacobite army could have defeated the British army and marched on London, but that in all 
likelihood would have led to a civil war. A civil war was not good for the Jacobites (but it 
was great for Spain) because in a civil war people had to choose who they were willing to 
support. There were still too many problems between the way the Jacobites and the Stuarts 
wanted to run the country versus the way Britons felt about how their country should be run. 
When it comes right down to it, Britain did not appear to be ready to accept a Catholic 
monarch (James Francis Edward Stuart) not matter what concessions he was willing to 
give.
258 
Religious toleration or lack thereof appeared to be the biggest problem standing in the 
way of James obtaining the British throne.  
 There is some reason to believe that the invasion had a greater chance of success if the 
Jacobites and especially James put their attention and efforts solely on Scotland. Scotland and 
northern England were not well defended. Britain only deployed 3,000 men to western 
England when it heard of the impending invasion and this was a more important area to 
                                                          
258
 Scott Sowerby, Making Toleration. 
110 
 
protect than Scotland.
 259
 If Britain had to concede any territory and had to choose a place to 
fight the Jacobites even if only temporarily, it would have been its newest addition to the 
Union, Scotland. The Jacobites had expected a large number of followers to support them 
during the rebellion. Ormonde probably had the best idea of what support was like in western 
England because he had been in charge of that area during the fifteen, and from his letters he 
expected a strong showing.
260
 Yet when the Jacobites landed in Scotland, no rebellion 
occurred in England. The supporters the Jacobites had in England (most likely the same 
support base leftover from the fifteen) were probably waiting on the main invasion force to 
arrive before they joined in and rightfully so. In Scotland, however, the support for the 
rebellion was still rather lackluster. By the battle of Glenshiel a few months into the rebellion, 
the Jacobites had a little over a thousand supporters. Where did all their followers go? 
Tullibardine the Jacobite “commander” who landed in Scotland may have been right in 
suggesting that the rebellion had occurred too close to the fifteen and supporters were still 
unwilling to join until it appeared that a rebellion was well underway. The alternative is that 
the Jacobites overestimated their support in Scotland. Probably the truth lies somewhere close 
to both statements. Many supporters were still waiting for the main invasion force to arrive 
and did not want to risk a failed rebellion and the possible consequences, but at the same 
time, the Jacobites were probably overzealous in the expectation of numbers. Either way 
without the major landing force making it to Britain we will never know. The reality of the 
situation is that having James focus solely on Scotland, however, seems unlikely to have 
happened because as mentioned above James was unwilling to concede one part of his 
“kingdom.” Therefore, it appears as though the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion (under the revised 
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plans) even if it had landed in Scotland or Britain was unlikely to have succeeded for the 
Jacobites, but the Jacobites were not the only side interested in the outcome of the rebellion. 
 Spain on the other hand did not need the Jacobites to be successful in order to achieve 
their goals for the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. In fact, all Spain really needed was Britain out of 
the Mediterranean for a few months. If the Jacobite invasion landed anywhere in Britain and 
the combined army of Spanish and Jacobite soldiers fought the British army for a few 
months, there was a good chance that Spain could have held the advantage in the War of the 
Quadruple Alliance. With Britain out of the Mediterranean or, at the very least, unable to 
send reinforcements to the Mediterranean, Spain could have resupplied its army that was 
trapped in Sicily. Once Sicily was won then Spain’s army of 30,000 men could have gone 
onto the Italian Peninsula or returned to Spain to confront the French, or even possibly to 
invade France. It is hard to know Spain’s next step after Italy since they never had a chance 
to fully develop their plans for after the rebellion. Since the rebellion failed to neutralize 
Britain and France and Britain consequently invaded them, Spain never had a chance to 
resupply and redeploy its army in Sicily.   
The French Connection 
 The last scenario worth counterfactual consideration is probably the most farfetched, 
but without taking it to extremes; it can help show the importance of a successful rebellion 
for Spain. The War of the Quadruple Alliance was a war that was unpopular for many who 
were involved. France was reluctant to invade too far into Spain because it feared a Spanish 
counter-offensive and invasion. Britain was willing to fight a naval war but did not want to 
involve foot soldiers. Austria was really the only country that had a will to fight, but they had 
the weakest military and if Spain defeated the Austrian army in Sicily there was little Austria 
could do to stop another Spanish invasion. If Spain had taken its army with 30,000 plus 
troops into France to counter the French invasion then the War of the Quadruple Alliance 
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would be remembered to this day. With the number of Jacobites in France and the 
connections that the Jacobites had it was possible to support a Spanish army in France. If 
Spain gained control of France then Philip V, who had a legitimate claim to the French 
throne, would have become king of two countries. The young dauphin king might have 
disappeared or been exiled himself. Under this scenario with the resources now under Spain’s 
control, there may have even been another attempt to restore the Stuarts to Britain. Even 
without another invasion of Britain, the uniting of France and Spain under one monarch 
would have become a huge problem for the rest of Europe. There would probably have been 
a new Franco-Spanish and maybe even Anglo alliance that would have lasted for thirty years 
or so until Philip’s death. Upon Philip’s death, (in this unlikely situation of scenarios) it is 
likely that there was another War of Succession and from there anything could have 
happened. 
Which plan to blame? 
January was a turning point when the King of Sweden died and was officially out of 
the Jacobite plans. Because of this, assigning blame becomes much more difficult. Once 
revised invasion plans were drawn up it seems that to place fault for the failure of the 
expedition we have to determine which plan is at fault. The first invasion plan with the help 
of Sweden would have to fall on Ormonde if it had failed, (which for the Jacobites, it is likely 
that it would have failed to succeed long term because of the ideological differences between 
Britons and the Jacobites) but this plan never happened. The second plan developed after the 
King of Sweden’s death still used Ormonde’s ideas, but was not the same plan that Ormonde 
had drawn up. For one thing, the invasion fleet sailed almost one month later than Ormonde 
had hoped. They also lost the additional help of Sweden. Since Ormonde was only asking for 
3,000 Swedish troops, this might not seem like a huge blow, but just having the prestige of 
the Kingdom of Sweden helping would have helped to motivate the Jacobite base in Britain. 
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Not only that, but Sweden was a Protestant Kingdom. With the fears of the Jacobites being all 
Catholic and under the direction of the Pope, having a legitimate Protestant Kingdom as an 
ally would help dismiss many of the rumors and anti-Catholic feelings. This could only have 
benefited the Jacobites. A final difference between the two plans was the confidence of its 
leaders. As previously mentioned, in the new plan before the fleet was supposed to leave 
Corun a, Ormonde wrote to Alberoni and others to tell of his doubt that the expedition would 
succeed as implemented. In fact, before Ormonde received Alberoni, Philip, and James’s 
response he had made up his mind to sail directly to Scotland. If the timing was a little 
different and the fleet arrived sooner before he received Alberoni’s letters, Ormonde would 
have sailed directly to Scotland and just initiated a rebellion there. In hindsight, this might 
have gathered the most recruits and in turn had the best chance of all the possible rebellions 
of winning battles if it had made it there. With as fickle as the Jacobite army was, a large 
Spanish army supporting the Pretender could only have helped recruit numbers and support. 
Now let us look at Alberoni, Philip, and Spain.  
Alberoni and Philip were adamant about sailing, and for Spain the quicker the 
expedition sailed the better, but Spain had completely different goals for the expedition than 
the Jacobites. Alberoni used the expedition to benefit Spanish interests and not the Jacobites. 
If the invasion had overthrown George I then it was just an added bonus. Therefore, from a 
Spanish perspective as long as some troops made it to Britain, it in turn helped Spain in the 
Mediterranean. This explains why Alberoni and Philip were always willing to change the 
plan and help fund the expedition so long as it attacked England. Therefore, Spain was 
willing to risk a small amount (which to the Jacobites seemed a large sum) for the possibility 
that Britain left the Mediterranean and therefore Spain gained control of Sicily and possible 
more. So long as an expedition went to Britain, Spain benefited.  
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In many ways, this view of the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion is like the modern 
interpretation of the 1588 Spanish Armada.
261
 The two events have more in common than just 
terrible luck with the English and weather. What might look to some like a terrible failure 
that was ill planned, was actually a better solution than not launching the invasion. Some 
historians today view the 1588 Armada as a success for Spain.
262
 It was better for Spain to 
sail to England and show that it had the men, ships, and ability to invade than to not sail at 
all. Much of the same was true for the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion. For Alberoni and Spain it 
was better to launch a quickly planned invasion attempt at the British to show that Spain 
could compete with Britain than it was not to do anything, and watch Britain control the 
Mediterranean and in turn the War of the Quadruple Alliance. The weather, however, did not 
cooperate with Spanish intentions and for Spain the expedition turned out to be just unlucky.  
Alberoni seems to have missed a great chance for a more successful attempt at an 
invasion when Mar and the Jacobites contacted him in March and April of 1718. Alberoni, 
however, never responded to the Jacobite offers and both sides never pressed the issue until 
fall. It was only after the Battle of Cape Passaro that Alberoni became active in seeking out 
an ally to attack Britain and found the Jacobite still willing. If Alberoni had gone on the 
offensive in March or April, Spain might have saved some of its fleet from being destroyed at 
Passaro, putting it in a better position to invade Britain. Then again, who is to know if another 
storm would have come by and destroyed this invasion attempt as well since it would have 
sailed during a more stormy time of year?   
Despite missing this potential chance, Cardinal Alberoni should not take all of the 
blame for the failure of the 1719 rebellion; after all, he was Philip V’s scapegoat. Philip 
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deserves just as much of the blame for the failure of the invasion. Philip had just as much 
control over the country as Alberoni. In the end, it was the resources of Spain that let it down. 
Spain could only have overcome the setbacks that the expeditionary force suffered if it had 
had more men and resources, but it did not have enough ships even to resupply its army in 
Sicily let alone to re-launch another invasion attempt after the weather damaged the first. The 
Spanish empire was spread out thinly and therefore everything had to go perfectly to plan for 
the invasion to have had any chance of success. Based upon all of this, besides the weather, 
the blame for the failure of the 1719 rebellion has to fall on a lack of Spanish resources. 
Because of the timing of the expedition (during the invasions of Spain by France and Britain) 
there was little that Spain could have done without putting itself in too vulnerable of a 
position. 
The 1719 Jacobite Rebellion 
Without going too far into the possibilities, it is safe to say that there are a myriad of 
what-ifs when dealing with this rebellion. The possibilities of what could have been or the 
counterfactual history are endless, but in reality the 1719 Jacobite Rebellion was 
unsuccessful. Its failure weakened support for the Jacobite movement with no invasion 
occurring for the next twenty six years, rendered Spain almost insignificant in Europe, and 
brought about the demise of the political career of Alberoni. It was so much of a failure that it 
remains understudied and largely forgotten. The ambitious plans of Ormonde and Alberoni, 
however, should not go unnoticed, for their plan, despite its flaws and ultimate failure shows 
us how easily the Europe we know today could have looked drastically different. The 
Jacobite Rebellion of 1719 should be remembered for what it was: A truly Jacobite rebellion 
with the assistance of Spain that if it had not been for the weather could have shook the 
foundations of Europe in the eighteenth century.  
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APPENDIX: TIMELINE OF EVENTS 
1685- James II crowned king of England; Monmouth Rebellion  
1688- James Francis Edward Stuart born; William invades England 
1689- Battle of Killiecrankie (Scotland campaign); Dundee killed; Siege of Londonderry 
(Ireland Campaign) 
1690- Battle of the Boyne (Ireland campaign) 
1691- Treaty of Limerick (Ireland Campaign ends)  
1701- James II dies; War of Spanish Succession Commences 
1702- William III dies; Anne Stuart takes over British throne 
1708- Failed Jacobite invasion attempt 
1714- War of Spanish Succession ends; Anne Stuart dies; George I becomes British Monarch  
1715- Failed Jacobite Rebellion; Spain lends aid to Jacobite cause 
1717- Swedish invasion attempt discovered; War of the Quadruple Alliance begins 
1718- April- Mar writes to Alberoni about possible invasion 
 August- British fleet sent to Mediterranean; Battle of Cape Passaro 
October- Jacobites begin plans for Spanish Invasion, Ormonde travels to Spain; Spain 
seizes goods of all British citizens in Spain 
 November- Ormonde reaches Spain 
 December- Ormonde and Alberoni create plan for British invasion 
1719- January- Second plan for invasion drawn up once Sweden leaves planned invasion 
 February- Spanish fleet delayed  
 March- Storm system damages Spanish fleet; Jacobite rebellion begins in Scotland  
 April- France and Britain invade Spain; Spain puts invasion on hold 
 May- Jacobites fight British forces at Eilean Donan Castle 
 June- Jacobite Rebellion put down at battle of Glenshiel 
 December- Alberoni forced to leave Spain 
1720- Peace Treaty Ending War of the Quadruple Alliance 
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